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High Point Police Department

June 29 2006

Rob T. Guerette
School of Policy and Management
University Park, PCA 366B
Florida International University
11200 S. W. 8th Street
Miami, Florida 33199

Re: 2006 Herman Gold Stein Award

Dear Dr. Guerette,

Enclosed is the High Point, North Carolina Police Department's submission for the 2006 Herman Goldstein Award. I am honored to submit this nomination on behalf of the men and women who represent the High Point Police Department. The personnel within this department have conducted, what I think is, one of the most exciting, innovative, and effective projects related to Problem Oriented Policing.

Working with David Kennedy, of the John Jay School of Criminal Justice, and a number of other partners, the High Point Police Department designed and implemented a strategy to eliminate overt drug trafficking in High Point. The strategy dramatically improved conditions in High Point's most troubled neighborhoods and reduced drug and violent crime city-wide. Most important, I think, it did so in a way that addressed and repaired deep historic racial divisions in our community, and as a result put the community at the forefront of setting and enforcing its own standards. Law enforcement helped organize the effort and played an important role in carrying it out, but because of the strength of the larger partnership, the need for actual enforcement was minimal. As we recognize the inadvertent damage that profligate drug enforcement does to individuals and to communities, this is a crucial development.

The core ideas of this project are simple. The most powerful step that could be taken to address overt drug activity in troubled neighborhoods would be for offenders' own


communities to set clear standards that such crime is unacceptable. Because of deeply rooted racial animosity toward law enforcement and outsiders, communities do not typically do so. Much of communities' anger at law enforcement is justified, while in turn law enforcement does not see the genuine strength in communities, nor the real opposition to drug and violent crime. These are highly charged issues, but we found that working through them is possible and opens the door to a simple but very powerful intervention focused on the small number of offenders active in any given drug market. Operationally, the intervention identifies these dealers; creates but does not initially pursue a criminal case against them; reaches out to dealers' families and other "influentials"; and brings together for a face-to-face meeting law enforcement, dealers, influentials, service providers, and community figures. In that meeting three messages are delivered. The first is from the community, saying in its own voice that drug activity is destroying the community and cannot be tolerated. The second is from service providers, that help is available for dealers and their families. The third is from law enforcement, that dealers have to stop and that if they do not they will be arrested and aggressively prosecuted on their existing case. The message is direct - there will be no more overt dealing in the neighborhood. In each case, the market in question has vanished overnight, with additional positive effects elsewhere in the city. After the third such intervention early this month, overt drug activity in High Point is essentially gone.

Members of the High Point Police Department, at all levels, are involved in this project; they have taken ownership and responsibility for the implementation and management of the project. This model is being implemented in several other cities around the country, and if implemented in a manner similar to High Point, they will be just as successful. I think this program completely incorporates the concept of Problem Oriented Policing. It is repeatable in any size agency, it relies on a careful and – if I may say so – courageous analysis of the problem, it relies heavily on the input and participation of the community, and most significantly, it positively changes the relationship between the community and law enforcement.

In summary, the High Point Police Department thinks it has implemented a unique, sustainable, and cooperative initiative that benefits the citizens of High Point, enables the community and neighborhood, and reduces drug dealing and associated crime.

I am proud to represent the High Point Police Department in the submission of this application for the 2006 Herman Goldstein Award.

Sincerely,



James H. Fealy, Chief
High Point Police Department

Eliminating Overt Drug Markets in High Point, North Carolina

I. Summary

This project was designed to, and did, essentially eliminate “overt” drug markets – street sales, and associated drug houses – citywide in High Point, North Carolina. The goal was to reduce the full range of harm associated with overt public drug markets. These harms included the usual crime and public safety concerns – violence, disorder, prostitution, economic devaluation and disinvestment – but were also explicitly framed to include harms not usually taken seriously by law enforcement. These included, especially, the damage to race relations associated with the usual frameworks on drug issues, and the individual and community harms created by traditional drug enforcement. Distinctively, and probably uniquely, it explicitly recognized and addressed the norms and narratives around drug issues that are embedded in law enforcement, communities, and offenders. In so doing, it recognized implicit common ground among all these parties and crafted a strategic response in which all parties could change their behavior for mutual benefit.

This strategy grew out of the familiar focused deterrence or “pulling levers” framework, but added transformational elements. An operational plan was developed that addressed individual geographic drug markets as “beachheads” in a larger citywide enterprise that directly engaged drug dealers and their families; created (but rarely employed) clear, predictable sanctions; offered a range of services and help; and, especially, mobilized community and even offender standards about right and wrong. Over the two-year course of implementation, overt drug markets, in High Point were eliminated, directly and sustainably. No outside or additional resources were employed. There was no apparent displacement, and clear diffusion of benefits.

Few arrests were made. Many drug dealers are now gainfully employed. Community conditions in the drug market areas are dramatically improved, as are police/community relations and race relations generally in the city.

The strategy has been successfully replicated in Winston-Salem, North Carolina and Newburgh, New York, and is being pursued in Raleigh, North Carolina and (in cooperation with the National Urban League, the Justice Department's Office of Community-Oriented Policing Services, John Jay College of Criminal Justice, and Winston-Salem State University) in Providence, Rhode Island; Kansas City, Missouri; Ft. Wayne, Indiana; and Tucson, Arizona.

II. Description

A. Scanning

High Point is a city of approximately 95,000 in central North Carolina (it adjoins the much larger city of Greensboro) with a furniture-industry industrial base. The city is 60% white and 30% African-American; some 13% of the population and 10% of families live below the poverty line. High Point started experiencing serious drug activity and gun violence in the mid 1990s, when its homicide rate climbed higher than Greensboro and nearby Winston-Salem.

High Point, working with Harvard University's David Kennedy, became one of the first cities to replicate Boston's focused-deterrence violence prevention strategy, launching the interagency Violent Crime Task Force (VCTF) in 1997. The VCTF grew to include the High Point Police Department (HPPD); the US Attorney; the Guilford County District Attorney; Probation; Parole; the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms, and Explosives; the Drug Enforcement Administration; the Federal Bureau of Investigation; numerous city agencies, service providers, churches, and community groups; and research partners from Harvard, Winston-Salem State University and the University of North Carolina, Greensboro. The violent

crime rate has decreased 47% since 1997 despite the city's steady population increase. More than that, the focused deterrence/direct engagement approach became part of the way HPPD and its partners thought about and did its work.

In 2002, James Fealy was named chief in High Point and immediately decided to focus on overt drug markets, which continued to plague the city. Fealy's first tour of the city was enough to show chronic street-corner dealing, crack houses, prostitution, and drive-through drug buyers. These markets were exclusively in poor minority neighborhoods, though drug and sex buyers often came from outside. The markets drove a wide range of crime; community complaints were chronic. HPPD and its partners did a great deal of street drug enforcement, warrant service, and investigation of mid-level dealers, but to no effect; some of High Point's open-air markets dated back 40 years to the first heroin epidemic. All of this was familiar to Fealy, who had the same experiences and frustrations from his career in Austin, Texas.

In the fall of 2003, Fealy and HPPD Majors Marty Sumner and Randy Tysinger; Narcotics Unit Lieutenant Larry Casterline; and Assistant US Attorney Rob Lang began discussions with Kennedy about framing a different approach to the problem. The goal was to eliminate overt drug markets citywide and address the key problems associated with them: homicide, gun assault, robberies and other serious violence; sexual assault; prostitution; drive-through drug buyers; and broad community quality of life concerns. To these goals, Kennedy added an additional set of issues: racial conflict between communities and law enforcement, and the individual and community harm produced by traditional drug enforcement.

B. Analysis

One set of analyses was drawn from relevant scholarly literatures and from extensive field experience (all those who framed this project have decades of exposure to drug markets, drug

enforcement, drug offenders, and affected communities). The second set was conducted specifically for the High Point operation.

B.1). “Drug Markets” vs. “Drugs”

Many of the crime and community problems associated with “the drug problem” are a function of overt, disorderly drug markets, rather than with drugs as such. Street dealing and crack houses create dynamics in communities that discreet drug markets do not, just as a street sex market creates greatly more harm than does an escort service. The project was thus framed not as *doing something about drugs* but as *eliminating overt drug markets*.

To identify overt drug markets, HPPD mapped drug arrests; calls for service; field contacts; and Part I, weapons, sexual, and prostitution offenses. Within hot spots, serious crimes were individually reviewed for a drug connection. Information from patrol officers, vice/narcotics investigators, informants, and crime tip lines was analyzed. The West End, Daniel Brooks/Washington Dr. and Southside neighborhoods were identified as major overt markets (see Exhibit 1). The West End and Southside areas are largely rental housing; Daniel Brooks is entirely public housing. In the West End, which was selected for the initial operation, analysis showed that the small hot-spot area had generated roughly ten percent of High Point’s violent crime for over a decade (including the city’s most recent homicide).

B.2). Market dynamics

Overt drug markets have strong sustaining dynamics. Buyers know that they can buy there, and sellers know that they can sell there, so both have reason to continue in the same place even in the face of real risks. There is safety for both sides in numbers. Enforcement rarely reaches the whole market at once – for instance, addressing all sellers simultaneously – so even large numbers of drug arrests over time do not shut the market down. Buyers and sellers subject to

enforcement action return to a thriving market, minimizing even the specific deterrent effects of enforcement. This stubborn persistence is thus the result of classic “tipping” and “enforcement swamping” dynamics¹. Theoretically, however, an intervention that did shut a market down entirely could interrupt these dynamics and produce disproportionate effects.

B.3). Formal sanctions matter

Low-level drug dealers tend to accrue extensive criminal histories but tend to face low risks at any given moment. Research shows dealers can average hundreds of transactions between arrests², and most drug arrests result in low-level sanctions. High risks are unusual and generally cannot be predicted. An effective deterrence framework should thus produce a high risk of a meaningful sanction, and make that clear to offenders.

B.4). Formal sanctions should be minimized

High levels of drug enforcement do enormous damage to individuals and communities. Personal and social capital is damaged, individuals and whole cohorts have little reason to finish school and take entry-level jobs, families are disrupted, the stigma of conviction and imprisonment are reduced and even reversed, and relations between communities and law enforcement are poisoned. Formal sanctions should thus be minimized.

B.5). Informal sanctions matter more than formal sanctions, but local norms and narratives stand in the way

Individual morality; the views of respected family, peers, and role models; and clear community standards are the most powerful underpinnings of good behavior. These influences

¹ On tipping, see, for example, Gladwell, Malcolm 2002 The Tipping Point: How Little Things Can Make a Big Difference New York:Back Bay Books. On enforcement swamping, see Kleiman, Mark A. R.,1993 “Enforcement Swamping: A Positive-Feedback Mechanism in Rates of Illicit Activity” *Mathematical and Computer Modeling* Vol. 17 No. 2

² Jacobs, Bruce A. 1999 Dealing Crack: The Social World of Streetcorner Selling Northeastern University Press:Boston

are not aligned against drug dealing in troubled communities. Deeply racialized narratives identify drug enforcement with the long history of deliberate oppression of the minority community, implicate government conspiracies in the drug trade, and label law enforcement as racist³. Among networks of offenders, informal norms require individuals to act as if jail and prison are nothing to fear, early death is inevitable, disrespect requires violence, and the like⁴. There are strong community feelings against drug offending, and offenders have real interests in stepping away from the street, but these norms and narratives keep them from being clearly expressed⁵.

B.6). Mutual misunderstanding perpetuates these dynamics

All parties involved misunderstand each other in important ways. Law enforcement and other outsiders see no clear stand from communities against drug offending and believe that the moral strength of communities has been lost. Communities see law enforcement pursuing transparently ineffective and destructive strategies and infer corruption and deliberate oppression. Drug offenders see their own communities and believe that their own actions are excused, tolerated, and even celebrated. Drug offenders see each other and believe that each is committed to deviance. Law enforcement sees offenders as irrational and even sociopathic. At work are classic social dynamics such as “attribution error”, in which belief commitment is wrongly inferred from behavior, and “pluralistic ignorance”, in which members of a group

³ Wacquant, Loic 2002 “Deadly Symbiosis” Boston Review April/May

⁴ Anderson, Elijah 1999 Code of the Streets: Decency, Violence, and the Moral Life of the Inner City WW Norton and Co: New York

⁵ Sampson, Robert J. and Dawn Jeglum Bartusch 1998 “Legal Cynicism and (Subcultural?) Tolerance of Deviance: The Neighborhood Context of Racial Differences” Law and Society Review Vol. 32, No. 4

wrongly infer and then follow group norms.⁶ These norms, narratives, and dynamics are never explicitly addressed, misunderstandings are not revealed, and common ground is not apparent.

B.7). Help matters

Drug offenders should have help to do better. Support and services – mentoring, treatment, education, employment, and the like – should be provided..

B.8). Small numbers of drug offenders

Even in communities with severe drug market problems, only a small number of offenders drive the problem. Research shows that at any given time only a few percent of (largely) young men are heavily involved.⁷ We were taken aback by how few dealers our process showed to be active: for the West End and Daniel Brooks each area had 16 , and Southside had 26.

Careful examination of High Point's markets revealed other important patterns. In the West End we found that the drug houses were not in the core of the hot spot itself but surrounded it (see Exhibit 2). Heavy enforcement within the hot spot itself would thus be unproductive, as had in fact been the case. This pattern was identified in Daniel Brooks and South Side, and has been seen in other jurisdictions with which we have since worked.

C. Response

The operational plan that resulted from these considerations was designed to address the conflict and misunderstanding between law enforcement and communities; elevate positive norms within communities and offenders; focus those influences on dealers; provide help to

⁶ See Perkins, H. Wesley, 2003 "The Emergence and Evolution of the Social Norms Approach to Substance Abuse Prevention" in Perkins, H. Wesley, ed., The Social Norms Approach to Preventing School and College Age Substance Abuse Jossey-Bass:San Francisco

⁷ The original Boston research can be taken in this light; an audit of all drug crews in Boston showed fewer than 1500 citywide, less than 3% of the relevant age group. Similar research in other cities produced similar results.

dealers; disrupt self-sustaining market dynamics; and back those influences with predictable consequences.

C. 1). Addressing law enforcement and community norms and narratives

The central idea in forming the intervention was that the most powerful step possible would be for dealers' families and communities to tell them clearly that they needed to stop. Stop their illegal activity or drug dealing. This required addressing the many issues that stood in the way of expressing those norms. Alongside the more technical elements of the operation there was therefore a series of discussions within law enforcement, in community circles, and then between law enforcement and communities. These discussions were initially led by Kennedy (High Point partners took them over after the initial operation in the West End) and addressed:

- Within law enforcement, the deep historic and racial narratives through which drug enforcement was viewed in the affected communities; the real, if unintended, harm that drug enforcement did in the community; and the fact that what was common knowledge in law enforcement was never discussed in public (for example, that law enforcement would like to stop profligate drug enforcement but does not know what else to do);
- With community figures, the ways in which existing community narratives gave license or even encouragement to dealers; that the community did not clearly articulate its real opposition to drug dealing; and that the community was free to take any position it chose on racial and other important issues and still say to the small number of drug dealers in the community that what they were doing was wrong;
- With both sides, the fact that low-level drug dealing is driven as much or more by small-group dynamics as by individual character and calculation; that offenders' views on the positions of the community and the legitimacy of law enforcement mattered as much, and

probably more, than enforcement risks and economic benefits; and that positive norms and narratives also existed within offenders and offender networks.

This process was scary, but profound. HPPD felt that it had a strong relationship with the minority community but this process showed clearly that even those who had worked closely together had not really understood each other. The Community was deeply angry at law enforcement and felt that we were incompetent or doing deliberate harm. We did not see community opposition to drugs and violence. We did not credit at all that dealers were rational and reachable, as events have clearly proven. These discussions went very well, however, with both sides rapidly moving to a focus on what to do next.

C. 2). Citywide strategy, with “beachheads”

The goal was to eliminate overt drug activity throughout High Point by addressing individual markets serially. The key moment in each intervention would be a “notification” or “call-in” at which law enforcement, community members, and service providers delivered a unified message to dealers in the company of their families. When it was clear that a “beachhead” market could be maintained effectively, a new one would be identified and addressed. In the end, only three operations were necessary: the West End (May 2004), Daniel Brooks (April 2005), and Southside (June 2006). As will be described below, diffusion of benefits after each of the first two operations greatly reduced drug market activity citywide.

C. 3). Careful identification of all active players

Intervening simultaneously with all dealers in a market was seen as crucial to disrupting the market and the small-group/network dynamics supporting offending. For each market, Vice/Narcotics detectives surveyed patrol officers, probation officers, street narcotics officers and community members and reviewed every arrest report, incident report, and field interview

associated with possible dealers. All known associates were reviewed. Suspects' current activities were checked. The process uncovered, as noted, a very small number of active dealers.

C. 4). Identifying “influentials”

A key notion was to enlist those close to offenders – parents, grandparents, guardians, old heads in the communities, ministers – to create and reinforce positive norms and expectations.⁸ For each dealer, one or several “influentials” was identified – in practice, primarily mothers and grandmothers – by reviewing the dealer’s contact history, booking records, probation officer contact logs, and jail visit lists. We were very concerned about how “influentials” would react when approached (see below): whether they would be in denial, benefiting from drug proceeds, unalterably hostile to law enforcement, and the like. In fact, nearly all were responsive and helpful.

C. 5). Services

Services were identified and organized. A resource coordinator was hired to work closely with dealers and their families⁹. A group of ministers, service providers, health care workers, non-profits, educators, and elected officials worked to ensure needs – most commonly employment, housing, transportation, and help enrolling in GED programs – were met. For the initial intervention in the West End, the High Point city manager even offered jobs to offenders who could pass a drug test.

⁸ Much of this thinking – about reintegrative shaming, the influence of personal networks, and similar themes – was inspired quite directly by the restorative justice literature, but taken out of that literature’s usually case-based operational framework

⁹ This position was originally funded out of existing Project Safe Neighborhoods funds, and later made a permanent city position.

C. 6). Creating deterrence: “banking” cases

In each market, ordinary investigative techniques were used to make cases against each dealer. Upper-level and clearly dangerous dealers were arrested, but – *in a key operational innovation* – most cases were “banked”. An arrest warrant could have been signed, but was not. This permitted law enforcement to tell dealers at the call-ins that if they continued dealing they would immediately be arrested – without further investigation – but that if they stopped nothing need happen to them. It also clearly showed communities and families that no profiling had occurred; and was an object demonstration that law enforcement understood that drug enforcement did damage and wished to change its own behavior.

C. 7). Post-intervention maintenance

Beat officers, Vice/Narcotics Detectives, and Street Narcotics Enforcement Officers watched relentlessly for any dealers to emerge in the target area, stopped them, and “marketed” this back to notified dealers, their families, and the community: somebody tried; we stopped them; this activity isn’t going to work or be tolerated. Overtime officers were assigned to the target areas for six weeks; they had very little to do and were withdrawn with no ill effect. Regular patrol officers developed a permanent strategy that included maintaining systematic contact with notified offenders, their families, and the community; a review of any Part I crime; and a graded response to any drug complaint that continued until the issue had been resolved.

C. 8). The initial intervention

Over the early months of 2004, the law enforcement and community conversations took place in the West End, dealers were identified and investigated, services organized, and “influentials” identified (see Exhibit 3 for a flow model of the strategy). During the two weeks before the May 18th call-in, teams consisting of a detective, a service provider and a West End

minister made home visits to the dealers and “influentials.” They were told that police had made undercover buys from the offender; that probable cause existed for an arrest; that an opportunity to avoid prosecution and an offer of assistance would be discussed at the call-in; and that family members and others were encouraged to attend. The offender received a letter from Chief Fealy inviting them to the call-in with a promise that no one would be arrested that night (see Exhibit 4).

Nine of the twelve dealers came to the meeting, accompanied by many “influentials” and others. They heard an uncompromising message from community speakers: “we care deeply about you, we’ll help you, but you’re hurting people and destroying the community and you need to stop.” They heard an uncompromising message from law enforcement: “you could be in jail tonight, we don’t want to do that, we want to help you succeed, but you are out of the drug business.” Blown-up surveillance photos of drug locations lined the walls; the dealers’ case books were on a table in front of them; and four chairs, bearing pictures of the dangerous offenders arrested as part of the operation, sat empty. Dealers’ mothers and grandmothers cheered both the community and law enforcement messages. Law enforcement’s willingness *not* to act on existing cases seemed to make a profound impression on the dealers’ families and other community members. Most dealers signed up for services; the next morning the coordinator got a call from a dealer previously unknown to law enforcement asking if he too could participate. This same basic pattern has continued for subsequent call-ins in other markets (20 of 20 invited dealers showed up at the recent Southside meeting).

The call-ins have been electrifying events, with police officers moved profoundly, drug dealers testifying to their gratitude for a second chance, community figures speaking in terms of both accountability and redemption, and family members speaking strongly and plainly to their

children. As hard as it was to believe that drug dealers would change their behavior, we now find it harder to understand how they would not.

D. Assessment

D. 1 The elimination of overt drug markets

There are no remaining overt drug markets in High Point.¹⁰ The quality of life in the affected neighborhoods has improved dramatically. Most important to us, these changes are almost entirely self-sustaining. We continue to work in these neighborhoods, but an active community consensus now stands against drug dealing.

The power of the strategy shocked us. The West End drug market vanished literally overnight. Street corner and drug house activity, drive-through buyers, and prostitutes were simply not in evidence. The character of the neighborhood changed immediately, with residents going outside again, children playing, people taking care of their properties, and a multitude of other signs of transformation. Particularly satisfying was that for the first time large numbers of local children attended one church's summer program: the kids said that their mothers had told them it was now safe to walk to church. Street and narcotics officers soon picked up a clear sense from offenders across High Point that the West End had become a "no go" area for drug dealers.

The same occurred in turn in both Daniel Brooks and Southside, with the fascinating development that in Daniel Brooks the market collapsed when we began public discussions with the community, and in Southside when we delivered the invitations to the notification. Offenders clearly knew what was coming and complied immediately.

¹⁰ We know that drugs are still sold in High Point. There is nowhere remaining in the city, however, where a stranger can walk or drive in and buy, and what drug activity remains is essentially invisible.

The markets are genuinely closed. In just over a month prior to the call-in, narcotics officers made multiple purchases from 11 different people at 17 locations in West End. In Daniel Brooks narcotics officers made multiple purchases from 12 different people at eight locations. In the Southside 51 street buys were made at 29 locations, multiple times at some locations. In each market, undercover officers and informants were able to make buys every time they tried. Following the call-ins, focusing on both these and other locations, we were unable to make a single buy. Informants attempted to make buys in the West End and Daniel Brooks several times a week for three months, without success. Informants now spot-check these neighborhoods once a month. The West End has now been closed for over two years and Daniel Brooks for over a year. We are seeing the same pattern in the Southside market.

No displacement has been evident. Of the eighteen dealers notified in the first two initiatives only three have been arrested for dealing, two in their initial areas and one elsewhere. No other hot spots emerged, rather, High Point improved overall after each call-in (see Exhibit 5 - Census Block Choropleth Maps). With Southside's closure, no overt market remains anywhere in the city.

D.2 Violent and Drug Crime

In the West End, violent and drug crime dropped dramatically. We examined crime not just in the formal target area but also in the larger area recognized as the West End neighborhood (Exhibit 6 and 7). Small absolute numbers make for large percentage shifts, particularly for short comparison periods, but two years out the reductions in violent crime – defined as murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, prostitution, sex offenses, and weapons – appear to have stabilized at between a quarter and a third. Most important, there has not been a homicide, rape, or gun assault in reported in the West End since the intervention. Gunshot calls for service have

dropped by over 50%. Drug crime is similarly down and has shifted from dealing offenses to minor possession, paraphernalia, and the like. We expect, based on similarities between the communities and the initial results from the recent notification, similar results in the Southside neighborhood.

Violent and drug crime statistics for the Daniel Brooks housing project are not as positive, for two reasons. Examination of the violent crime reported in Daniel Brooks showed it to be primarily domestic, on which this intervention is unlikely to have great impact.¹¹ Historically estranged relationships with the community and low levels of discretionary drug enforcement in Daniel Brooks meant that there was little reported drug crime before the intervention, which we know to be inaccurate. It's clear that conditions have improved, however. Researchers from High Point University surveyed Daniel Brooks nine months after the intervention. Of 88 respondents, 85% were familiar with the initiative, and 42% said drug dealing and use were substantially improved.¹² While the survey showed a number of areas where improvement is needed, we were particularly encouraged that – in our traditionally highest-crime housing project – “the majority of respondents had nothing but praise for police efforts. When asked to identify the biggest criticism they had with how the police do their jobs 30 percent instead spoke very favorably or simply indicated they had no concerns.” This is not the result we would have received before this initiative.

Vice/Narcotics officers, freed from laborious but essentially pointless street enforcement, have been freed to pursue more serious traffickers. They are making far more productive cases

¹¹ However, HPPD developed and is implementing a focused-deterrence Domestic Violence intervention in Daniel Brooks, with promising early results.

¹² Hayes, Terrel, K. James and C. Lambeth 2006 “An Assessment of the Daniel Brooks Initiative: Findings from the High Point Police Department Community Police Department Survey” Department of Behavioral Sciences and Human Services, High Point University.

and seizures are up by a factor of ten. We feel that we may finally be making headway on the core drug problem in High Point.

Violent crime citywide is down 20% over the two years of the initiative¹³. This is part of a continuing trend for the city (see Exhibit 8 – Historic Violent Crime Timeline) but is the largest decline since we launched the VCTF in 1997. We feel that this initiative has been a significant contribution.

D.3 Very few arrests

As noted, very few of the notified dealers have been arrested. We take this as an enormous accomplishment; it is clearly not necessary to lay siege to the community in order to address this problem.

D.4 Many dealers doing well

We learned a lesson in the Daniel Brooks initiative, in which – in addition to the regular menu of services – a church-based ex-offenders' group matched mentors with the dealers. Most of those dealers are now working regular jobs; we have followed the same process in the recent Southside intervention and expect the same results. In the recent Southside call-in nine of the offenders have already contacted the resource coordinator: seven are currently looking for employment and two are making use of housing assistance services.

D.5 Racial reconciliation

Finally, this process has profoundly changed everybody involved. None of us feel about this problem, or about each other, as we did before. What was a toxic, if unacknowledged, racial problem has become a source of strength. What began as a crime-control initiative has become something much more profound – a process that continues.

¹³ Based on published UCR reports the decrease from 2003 through 2005 is 21.5%:
<http://www.ncsbi.gov/crimestatistics/crimestatistics.jsp>

III. Agency and Officer Information

In preparation for this initiative the High Point Police command staff worked through its theory and logic in a three-hour session with Kennedy. Those ideas were cascaded to all operational personnel in the department. Kennedy also led a three-hour community session (attended by members of the command staff). These set the basic frame for the operation, with the details worked out by the department, its agency partners, and key community members (in episodic communication with Kennedy and research partners from UNC Greensboro and the Center for Community Safety at Winston-Salem State University).

All levels of the High Point Police Department were involved with the implementation of this initiative. The chief and majors went to every roll call, investigator's meeting and training day to ensure every member of the department understood the strategy, could provide input and was committed. Everyone was asked the same two questions, "Is this worth doing? Is this something you will support?" The overwhelming answer was yes. The implementation team involved all ranks and divisions. The Field Operations Assistant Chief, Vice/Narcotics Unit, Street Crimes Enforcement Unit, Patrol Supervisors assigned to the neighborhood, and beat officers from the patrol teams met weekly to discuss the progress of the initiative. Following the first call-in the chief and assistant chiefs took all the beat officers to a working lunch to develop the post intervention strategy.

For the officers "making a difference" became its own incentive. The results were so immediate, that officers took ownership and worked harder. Patrol officers took personal interest in the neighborhood and residences. At community meetings public praise was all the incentive

our officers needed. There is really no way to measure this: the incentives were intrinsic not material.


Implementation of this initiative was very cost effective. It was implemented mid-budget year with no additional resources. Approximately \$5,000 of investigation funds was used to make the undercover buys and pay the informants. Thirty thousand dollars of Weed & Seed overtime funds were used to pay for the two additional officers, for sixty days, to sustain a presence in the neighborhoods and to supplement the beat officers.

Beyond the immediate resources, this project drew on a decade of problem-oriented work beginning with the VCTF; officers know the process, saw the effectiveness of the program, and were able to adapt to the modifications in order to target overt drug dealing. HPPD believes in this way of doing things, pragmatically and philosophically, and now has officers in senior positions that have spent large portions of their careers operating this way. We think that this is the way we – and others – should do police work.

Project Contact Person:


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Exhibit 1: 2003 Baseline Density Map




The density is generated from an overlay of 911Calls, Field Contacts, Drug Arrests and Reported Serious Crime (Part I persons, weapons, sex and prostitution offenses). Understanding the conditions that generate the densities was essential. The map shows two densities (blue circles) that are artificial, based on reports and calls that default to the PD or County Buildings. Two areas were excluded because there had been recent large-scale narcotics operations and arrests which disrupted the Washington market, and “unpacking” the data revealed that most of the serious crime in East Central was not associated with a drug market. Three potential target areas were identified (green circles), Daniel Brooks, Southside, and West End.

Exhibit 2: West End Drug Buy locations and Associated Density



The West End Neighborhood shows individual houses and locations where undercover buys were made. The buy locations ring the high-density area. The drug market consists of six to seven blocks; however for analysis purposes the boundary of the West End neighborhood was utilized. Analysis of associated property crimes showed a patterned relationship: for example, residential burglaries generally formed a ring outside and around the drug houses, suggesting a relationship between acquiring goods and money in exchange for drugs.

Exhibit 3: Strategy Flow Model



Source: Dr. James M. Frabutt et al., at The Center for Youth, Family, and Community Partnerships at the University of North Carolina at Greensboro serving as the Project Safe Neighborhoods Research Partner for the United States Attorney's Office, Middle District of North Carolina. Supported by PSN funding (Award #2002-GP-CX-0220) through the U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs.

Exhibit 4: Chief's Letter

Jim Fealy
Chief of Police



PHONE (336) 887-7970
FAX (336) 887-7972
TDD (336) 883-8517

High Point Police Department

April 29, 2004

John William Doe:

As Chief of Police with the High Point Police Department, I am writing to let you know that your activities have come to my attention. Specifically, I know that you are involved in selling drugs on the street. You have been identified as a street level drug dealer after an extensive undercover campaign in the West End area.

I want to invite you to a meeting on May 18, 2004, at 6:00 PM at the Police Department. You will **not** be arrested. This is not a trick. You may bring someone with you who is important to you, like a friend or relative. I want you to see the evidence I have of your involvement in criminal activity, and I want to give you an option to stop before my officers are forced to take action. Let me say again, you will not be arrested at this meeting.

If you choose not to attend this meeting, we will be in contact with you along with members of the community. Street level drug sales and violence have to stop in High Point. We are giving you one chance to hear our message before we are forced to take action against you.

Chief James Fealy
High Point Police Department

Exhibit 5: Count of Serious Crime by Census Block

This series shows the changes in serious offenses in the West End and surrounding areas in three-month intervals from January 2003 through March 2006. The surrounding census blocks do not show a sustained increase in count indicating a possible shift in the drug market.









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







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




Exhibit 6: Change in the Counts of Violent Offenses two years before and after the West End Call-in.



The analysis compares counts of violent offenses in the West End neighborhood comparing the same number of days before and after the call-in. After the first one hundred days comparisons are made at fifty-day intervals. The average decline in Violent Crimes (Part I Persons, Weapons, Sex and Prostitution offenses) over a two-year period is 36.3%

Exhibit 7: Change in the Counts of Drug Offenses two years before and after the West End Call-in.



The analysis compares counts of drug offenses in the West End neighborhood comparing the same number of days before and after the call-in. After the first one hundred days comparisons are made at fifty-day intervals. The chart shows the counts of all types of drug offenses (selling as well as possession) for a two-year period before and after the call-in date. The average decrease in drug offenses over the period is 31.3 percent.

Exhibit 8: Fifteen Year Analysis of Violent Crime City-wide Compared with Population Growth

