

# **Crime Reduction & Community Safety Group**

# **Tilley Awards 2008 Application form**

Please ensure that you have read the guidance before completing this form. **By making an** *application to the awards, entrants are agreeing to abide by the conditions laid out in the guidance.* Please complete the following form in full, within the stated word limit and ensuring the file size is no more than 1MB. Failure to do so will result in your entry being rejected from the competition.

Completed application forms should be e-mailed to tilleyawards08@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk.

All entries must be received by noon on **Friday 25<sup>th</sup> April 2008**. No entries will be accepted after this time/date. Any queries on the application process should be directed to Alex Blackwell on 0207 035 4811.

### **Section A: Application basics**

- 1. Title of the project: Operation Enfield
- 2. Key issue that the project is addressing e.g. Alcohol related violence: Illicit Manufacture of Class A Drugs

#### Author contact details

- 3. Name of application author: DC 41 Gill Matthews
- 4. Organisation submitting the application: Cleveland Police
- 5. Full postal address:

Cleveland Police Headquarters PO Box 70 Ladgate Lane Middlesbrough TS8 9EH

6. Email address: gill.matthews@cleveland.pnn.police.uk

7. Telephone number: 01642 301745 mobile 07736 085 282

#### Secondary project contact details

8. Name of secondary contact involved in the project: D/Sgt Becky Driscoll

9. Secondary contact email address: Rebecca.driscoll@cleveland.pnn.police.uk

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10. Secondary contact telephone number: 01642 301721 mobile 07736 085 462

### Endorsing representative contact details

11. Name of endorsing senior representative from lead organisation: C/Supt Mark Braithwaite

12. Endorsing representative's email address: mark.braithwaite@cleveland.pnn.police.uk

13. For all entries from England & Wales please state which Government Office or Welsh Assembly Government your organisation is covered by e.g. GO East Midlands: GO North East

14. Please mark this box with an X to indicate that all organisations involved in the project have been notified of this entry (this is to prevent duplicate entries of the same project):

X

**Section B: Summary of application -** *In no more than 400 words use this space to provide a summary of your project under the stated headings (see guidance for more information).* 

## <u>Summary</u>

In January 2005, intelligence was received by Cleveland Police which indicated that there was a potential methamphetamine laboratory in the Cleveland Police area.

Methamphetamine is a synthetic drug that is easy to produce but the process is highly dangerous due to chemical toxicity and explosive potential, and has devastating physical consequences; often fatal to users.

The known local problem is poly drug use, predominantly heroin and local intelligence did not suggest methamphetamine was a local issue. In fact methamphetamine was unheard of in the local area and in the UK in general. It was a severe problem in other countries.

The Cleveland area is densely populated in comparison to most of the UK. There are 9.3 people per hectare, the national average being 3.5. Certain areas have severe deprivation, high unemployment and prostitution, which together promote poly drug use. Consequently, if methamphetamine became readily available, the potential impact would be considerable, and this had to be prevented.

The intelligence indicated a chemical company was involved in methamphetamine production. The business and home addresses for the two company directors were situated in two Basic Command Units (BCUs) within the Force area. Local Neighbourhood Officers were tasked to discreetly develop the intelligence, through observations and local knowledge. The overall results showed that there was nothing to suggest or indicate methamphetamine production at either location.

Enquiries identified this company was Internet based, and the site was trading worldwide in various chemicals. The site did not request information about end-use, delivery was offered to P.O. box numbers, and 'discreet deliveries' were guaranteed. As the prices were higher than elsewhere, the trading was considered suspicious: In essence, this business appeared to be supplying 'DIY kits' over the internet for methamphetamine production.

UK legislation restricts 23 chemicals in relation to export, but no restrictions apply when trading the same 23 within the UK. All other chemicals have no restrictions at all. This appeared to be a loophole in the law.

This project ascertained there was no manufacture of methamphetamine locally, but raised the awareness of the dangers of this substance locally, regionally and nationally and succeeded in preventing this company from further trading into wider illicit markets. The sharing of information collated led to laboratories being identified and closed

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worldwide. This action saved lives (abusers and responders alike) and prevented damage within those communities. Further, through collaboration with partner agencies, the UK legislative issues were addressed.

(400 words)

**Section C: Description of project -** *Describe the project in no more than 4,000 words. Please refer to the full guidance for more information on what the description should cover, in particular section 11.* 

### **Scanning**

The drug problem in Cleveland is multi faceted. The main problems are use of heroin and crack cocaine, with the associated acquisitive crime and community issues.

Methamphetamine is a highly addictive synthetic drug, produced in powder, tablet or crystal form, which can be created using a recipe consisting of several chemicals, including red phosphorous, crystal iodine and ephedrine. This process can be hazardous, as exposure to the chemicals themselves is toxic through airborne particles, causing skin irritations, breathing difficulties and potential burns, There is a constant risk of explosion through carelessness or inadvertent chemical interaction. When faced with information that production was possibly taking place in Cleveland, swift action had to be taken.

Intelligence from legitimate chemical traders raised suspicion of methamphetamine production in Cleveland. The suspicion came from the type of chemicals being sourced and sold, i.e., Red Phosphorus and Crystal lodine (two of the three main ingredients in common methamphetamine recipes). The volume of the chemicals sourced raised issues surrounding storage as the potential for explosion was high – especially the Red Phosphorus which is highly volatile (so much so that firework/pyrotechnic manufacturers advise against its use).

An investigation commenced and enquiries established that Target 1 and Target 2 were the only two directors of the company, and Target 1 had a pattern of conduct showing he was obstructive and uncooperative towards any authoritive agency, including Police. As such, an informal approach, to intervene or gain co-operation, was not an option.

Local neighbourhood officers carried out discreet enquiries at the business premises and both home address. Three children (under ten) resided with Target 2.

There was no evidence of methamphetamine production at any address. The recipient addresses of any buyers were unknown at this time, but the levels advertised and sold indicated that illicit production was still an issue.

It was established that large deliveries of chemicals (5 gallon containers) were being made to the business address and Target 1's address, raising issues surrounding the fact that these chemicals (and volumes) were being stored at inappropriate premises situated within residential and low level commerce areas. Concerns surrounding potential for explosion/exposure were a reality.

The company website appeared to offer 40+ chemicals for sale in small amounts. Some chemicals were offered as 'Buy 5 get 1 free', which raised postage and transportation issues; and a number of the chemicals, if shipped together, had explosive implications.

A multi agency meeting was arranged to discuss restrictions or interventions into this trading and storage:

Stockton Borough Council Middlesbrough Borough Council Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council Home Office Inspectorate Health and Safety Executive (not registered) Trading Standards Royal Mail (linking to the Australian customs authority)

**Stockton Borough Council** was the landlord for the business premises. The premises were leased for purposes of "Chemical storage and distribution/packaging in relation to pyrotechnics". A renewal of the lease would be blocked, but until that time trading could continue. Target 1 had lodged a complaint against the landlord in relation to them holding duplicate keys, indicating unauthorised access. This suggested Target 1's activities could be other than agreed, or suspicious.

**Middlesbrough Borough Council** no longer leased property to Target 1 but shared historic information explaining how Target 1 had been uncooperative and frequently complained.

**Redcar and Cleveland Borough Council** was the local authority for both residential addresses. An injunction had been obtained preventing any council officials attending Target 1's home address without prior arrangement.

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Therefore, an inspection at the address for unsafe chemical storage had been arranged by appointment, and at that time no chemicals were present.

**The Home Office Inspectorate** explained that Target 1 had applied for a license to trade in Ephedrine, a *'pre-curser'* (i.e. essential ingredient) chemical for methamphetamine production. This request would now be declined. However, this gave a definite indicator in the interest or involvement in illicit drug manufacture

Red Phosphorous and Crystal lodine are the other two main ingredients for methamphetamine, but neither is subject to monitoring or regulation within the UK. The company was advertising these two chemicals on the special offer mentioned. These two chemicals are tightly controlled within the US.

Target 1 had lived in the US during the 1990s, and during that time, in the locality he lived, Arkansas, there was endemic methamphetamine production and use. It is likely that this knowledge assisted him in identifying an exploitable gap in the UK market.

The Health and Safety offered to visit the business and inspect in relation to use of machinery. As the business was a 'buy in bulk and decant into small quantities' enterprise, it was acknowledged that machinery was not likely to be used. Plus, "the requirements were minimal, potential prosecutions would be lengthy and protracted, and any positive results comparatively ineffective" unquote.

**Trading Standards** described a prosecution in relation to dangerous packaging by the company. A legitimate purchaser had burnt his hands upon opening a package. Target 1 had been non-compliant throughout the process resulting in lengthy delays, and so the prosecution was pending. (Eventually, the result was a conditional discharge which had no impact upon trading)

**The Royal Mail** informed all of a hazardous incident that had occurred February 2005. Customs in Australia had intercepted a parcel that had arrived by Air, which was destined for a 15 year old girl, who was purchasing legitimately (for a circus act - 'ring of fire'). This package contained two chemicals (50g of aluminium powder and 50g of potassium perchlorate). If they had been mixed through pressure, damage, etc, an explosion would have occurred sufficient to blow up the aeroplane mid-air. Attempts to engage Target 1 had been ignored. (Cleveland Police liaised with Australian Customs and evidence was exchanged, but no offences were identified within the UK.).However, serious concerns surrounded the volumes (five gallons) of the same two chemicals being stored in Cleveland in properties not fit for purpose.

This collaboration identified:

That there was no existing legislation available allowing intervention

Target 1 would not voluntarily engage with any agency.

Strong indicators suggested the business was trading chemicals into illicit drug manufacturing markets.

Potential for supply to explosive manufacturers and terrorism had to be considered.

This project needed to establish how to intervene and put a stop to this enterprise: feeding illicit drug manufacturing markets via inappropriate handling thereby threatening both the local community and the wider global community.

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### <u>Analysis</u>

In January 2005 national research indicated that Methamphetamine use was unknown in the UK. Use was prevalent in the US, the Eastern Bloc, Australia and New Zealand. As such, this company's trading into illicit markets went largely undetected in the UK.

The immediate concern was the potential for methamphetamine to be introduced into an already poly-drug using environment, as well as dangers of manufacture. Associated dangers were the safety of the local community, threatened by the proximity of these chemicals being stored in an unsafe manner.

The company premises was located in a business complex, situated in a busy town centre, which housed other paper-based type businesses, and included a crèche facility and a café open to the public. It was only two blocks from the main Drug Addiction Treatment Centre, which treated 400+ registered addicts weekly. As a result, close liaison with health agencies was maintained to identify early signs of illicit drug abuse/manufacture:

#### Stockton Drug and Treatment Service (DAT), Stockton Primary Care Treatment Service (PCT), Birchtree GP Centre (specialist addiction service for Stockton) and the local adjacent Pharmacy

The Treatment Agencies did 'baseline testing' for methamphetamine abuse, and repeated the exercise 6 months later. (This showed that although methamphetamine was gradually being introduced to poly drug users, it was at a very slow rate and there was nothing to indicate actual production. This exercise was eventually repeated across the Force area and baseline figures accumulated. This was parallel, and at the request of, the Police enquiries, but would have alerted all if this substance was becoming prominent locally.)

The residential addresses were located approximately 25 miles away. They were both privately owned three bedroom end terrace properties opposite each other. They were located in a local authority housing estate. Target 1's property had a garage extension where chemicals were stored. It was in a cul-de-sac neighbouring other family homes and OAP housing. The three children brought other children to play at both these addresses.

Warrants were executed by Cleveland Police in March 2005 which enabled the business enterprise to be examined. Quantities of red phosphorus and crystal iodine had been sold together, predominantly to the US. In effect, the sales amounted to DIY methamphetamine or explosive kits.

The sourcing companies were contacted and they were able to revise their own policies for safe and appropriate trading, in particular when assessing delivery addresses. They all withdrew their trade with this particular business. Constant analysis indicated that this did not impact on the trade by this company, who was by then sourcing from Europe. Eventually they too were contacted, forcing this company to look elsewhere, which proved to be Asia. In essence the trading was not interrupted.

To identify a means to frustrate this inappropriate trading, partner agencies were broadened:

National Criminal Intelligence Service (NCIS) Drug Enforcement Administration of the USA (DEA) Maricopa Sheriffs Office, Arizona Immigration, Customs and Excise Agency of the USA (ICE) Anti Terrorist Branch of the Metropolitan Police (SO13) Assistant Attorney Office of the USA Crown Prosecution Agency (CPS)

It transpired that the US legislates to restrict Red Phosphorous and Crystal lodine sales in and to the US due to the abuse of these chemicals and as a result of the sharing of data, a number of illicit methamphetamine laboratories were identified in Phoenix, Arizona and positive action taken:

To ascertain the extent of this illicit trading and potential harm within communities within the UK, locally and nationally, all the business information was painstakingly trawled. Paper records counting into thousands were individually examined and cross referenced onto spreadsheet databases for dissemination. Computer hard drives were examined whereby each and every email was read to ascertain knowledge of illicit manufacturing:

What had started as a local problem had grown into an international problem and as a result of sharing, methamphetamine laboratories were discovered in a number of US states (34), Europe, Australia and in the UK.

Primarily, there was potential for a particularly nasty and hitherto unknown drug to be introduced into local poly-drug markets, which could create untold misery and harm.

Secondary, the information gleaned caused concern about safe storage of chemicals in unsuitable premises within communities that could be at risk from exposure and/or explosion, and any resulting harm. These issues were heightened due to the volumes of chemicals stored.

Cleveland Police had to find a method to prevent the introduction of methamphetamine into the local community, and intervene on apparent unsafe chemical storage within that same community.

743

## Response:

An action plan was devised:

Cease suspicious trading by this company. Ascertain levels of criminal conduct by Target 1 and Target 2. Disseminate locally, nationally, and worldwide for individual investigation. Raise the profile of methamphetamine locally and nationally regarding the identified dangers. Raise the concerns with the chemical industry to prevent future reckless onward-trading. Address weaknesses in legislation identified by this project.

The potential harm required measuring, in respect of the following:

Illicit manufacture of Methamphetamine within the local area and wider. Illicit manufacture of explosives and/or terrorist links within the local area and wider. The level of abuse by users of manufactured methamphetamine. The level of harm by manufacture of explosives and/or terrorist links.

As a result of the painstaking examination of the business records and computer hard drives, evidence of repeated offences contrary to section 20 Misuse of Drugs Act 1971 were identified: substances (knowingly) leaving the UK to enter illicit drug manufacture is unlawful.

Tellingly, after their first arrest, the Targets moved from Cleveland to Scotland, believing they had escaped the jurisdiction of Cleveland Police. The business moved to larger premises and 60+ chemicals were now advertised for sale on the company website.

As the offences identified under the Misuse of Drugs Act apply anywhere within the UK, and due to the complex nature of the enquiry, the Officers in the Case liaised with partners within **CPS**, **Central Scotland Police and the Procurator Fiscals Office** and it was mutually agreed that Cleveland Police retain ownership of the investigation.

It was also noted that shortly after the company moved to Scotland, a five gallon drum of red phosphorus had ignited. The local **Fire Brigade** had fought the blaze for three days and the **Environmental Agency** charged £3,000 to remove toxic waste from the scene.

This incident confirmed the risk factors, and highlighted the financial implications. Proceeds of crime and money laundering offences were considered and financial institutions approached who were able to freeze accounts, but it did not impact upon the obvious ongoing trading.

As offences had been identified and further questioning was required, a second arrest phase was planned. Warrants sworn out in England were 'backed' by **Falkirk Sheriff's Court**, and further partners were engaged: **Illicit Lab Unit**, local **Fire Brigade**, **Ambulance and Council** - along with 250 Central Scotland police personnel – to execute those warrants.

During the second arrest phase, 60 different chemicals were identified and volumes assessed. The largest volumes were 200 kilograms of Red Phosphorus and 54 kilograms of Iodine Crystals. Without intervention these two recoveries alone could have produced 2 tons of methamphetamine. All indicators suggested that this had been destined for illicit production and the potential on the methamphetamine markets and street values could have had a huge and devastating impact locally, nationally and internationally.

In relation to the evidence required to prove offences contrary to Section 20 MDA 1971, guilty knowledge is paramount. During interviews, the Targets denied all knowledge. They were placed on Police Bail again pending the repeat procedure of trawling through the second recovery of documents and computer hard drives.

Meanwhile, constant analysis identified an increase in their trading yet again.

Guilty knowledge amongst the Email chatter was considered sufficient for a prosecution to be prepared. To this end Cleveland Police approached their US counterparts to complete the evidential requirement (i.e. prove illicit manufacture had taken place outside of the UK).

At this time, the US made representation that due to the extent of damage caused to them, i.e. manufacturing of illicit

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substances in excess of 120 locations, explosions at other locations, children being exposed to toxic substances, some rescued, some not – extradition of the Targets was sought.

A multi-agency meeting was convened by all interested parties:

Cleveland Police, Central Scotland Police; Cleveland CPS; Procurator Fiscals Office, Scotland; SOCA (Series and Organised Crime Agency); SO13 (Metropolitan Ant- Terrorist Branch) DEA (Drug Enforcement Administration of the US); Maricopa Sheriff's Department, Arizona; ICE (Immigration, Customs and Excise Agency of the US) Prosecuting Agencies in the State of Arizona; and UK Extradition specialist lawyers.

It was concluded that extradition would be pursued via a multi-agency approach in order to satisfactorily resolve all identified issues.

As such, partnership working resulted in a Mutual Legal Assistance Treaty document being accepted by the Home Office and a third arrest phase took place in January 2007.

At this time, the company had a financial turn over of £11,000.00 per week. A sea container shipment of chemicals from China was docked during this third arrest phase. 12 like sea containers containing chemicals (predominantly Red Phosphorus and Crystal Iodine) were recovered at the business premises in Scotland.

Both targets were held in custody pending extradition proceedings and the trading ceased.

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#### Assessment:

Trading ceased:

Targets 1 and 2 were given bail in August 2008 and trading has not resumed. Both are now subject to extradition to the USA (subject to any appeal). In any event, they have indicated that they have no intention to pursue trading in chemicals.

The devised action plan described above resulted:

The Company has ceased trading.

All illicit trading has been stopped and further illicit manufacture has been prevented. Danger to the public at large from exposure and explosion has been halted, and potential misuse of methamphetamine arising from this company's production has been prevented, not just in the Cleveland Police area, but worldwide.

#### The level of criminal conduct by Target 1 and Target 2 was ascertained.

Although Section 20 offences could have been progressed within the UK, by far the greater level of crime committed and harm caused was within the US. The multi-agency approach agreed that prosecutions should be pursued wherever the most harm was caused. All UK criminality is in abeyance pending finality of the extradition proceedings.

Disseminations locally, and wider, were forwarded for individual investigation.

Locally, two teenagers acting independently were identified as experimenting with explosives and the Local Police were able to intervene prior to any harm or damage being caused. Two adult males acting independently were considered to be engaging in sex or paedophile conduct and as such are being monitored for future reference. There has been no direct connection with methamphetamine, which has reassured partner agencies and all are equipped to recognise changes in that in the future.

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Although time consuming and work intensive, intelligence was disseminated within the UK and internationally worldwide to intervene on harm within communities globally. The UK disseminations have resulting in several live enquiries and operations identifying methamphetamine laboratories, explosive factories and terrorist links.

The profile of methamphetamine was raised locally and wider, regarding its identified dangers.

A full assessment by all health and treatment partner agencies within Cleveland Police area has been carried out and the abuse of methamphetamine ascertained for future reference. Awareness of the issues surrounding such abuse and the dangers of manufacture has been highlighted to all staff. These partner agencies are better prepared should this drug become one of choice within the Cleveland Force area and continuous monitoring will now quickly identify any such trend.

All frontline responders within the Cleveland Police area have had presentations on methamphetamine delivered in relation to the inherent dangers associated with the manufacturing of it. The treatment services were included in relation to the awareness of the associated harm in relation to abuse. All of the following were included;

Front line Police Officers Police Community Support Officer's Council Wardens Control Room and Public Help Desk Staff Probation officers Community education personnel Fire Brigade Outreach community workers Community Volunteer personnel Drug and treatment services: All four Primary Care Trust's All four Drug Addiction Treatment bodies 's All specialist addiction treatment centres Accountable Officers within each health body

Other forces were represented and took copies of the presentation to deliver to their own Force area.

The methamphetamine profile within the UK: locally, regionally and nationally has been raised via Cleveland Police becoming active participants within the **ACPO National Working Party for Methamphetamine**. This project was used to illustrate a bid that Methamphetamine should be a Class A drug. That bid was successful in January 2007.

Associated dangers for front line responders, including all partner agencies is in the process of being adequately addressed to prevent future harm from both manufacture and abuse. The live and outstanding enquiries nationally, subject to this project, and all future like enquiries will be safely addressed as a result.

Guidance has been produced within Cleveland Police and other forces.

#### Concerns with the chemical industry were raised to prevent future reckless onward-trading.

The **ACPO National Working Party for Pre-curser Chemicals** has been introduced to raise the profile of abuse of chemicals and the need to apply more stringent controls. Due to the experiences of this project, Cleveland Police were invited to participate from the start. This project was used to identify weaknesses within UK legislation and as a direct result that legislation has been revised to address the loopholes identified during this investigation. Punitive measures were introduced via this group which should deter any future similar traders.

As a result, legitimate traders have been able to revise their policies and protocols for safe trading, in particular in relation to appropriate delivery sites and proper storage.

Address weaknesses in legislation identified by this project.

Legislation has been amended via both the mentioned ACPO National working Parties to cater for the weaknesses this project identified. Punitive measures were introduced in March 2008.

As a result, any harm caused has been intercepted, including:

Illicit manufacture of Methamphetamine within the UK Illicit manufacture of explosives and/or terrorist links within the UK The level of abuse by users of methamphetamine The level of harm by explosive manufacture and/or terrorist links

Typical examples received via direct dissemination are:

The Metropolitan Police executed a warrant under the explosives act and the recovery of numerous weapons, instructions, documentation, etc resulted in 5 charges surrounding firearms and ammunition offences. New Scotland Yard have since made various requests for statements to assist with charging individuals.

Devon and Cornwall Police arrested a male in relation to terrorism offences. A separate package resulted in the arrest and interview of a male suspected of being involved in an illicit lab. He is currently pending charges.

North Wales Police located and addressed a large methamphetamine laboratory resulting in prosecution.

West Mercia Police have a live enquiry regarding suspicious activity by a doctor with a close relative who is a known drug user. A separate enquiry resulted in charges under explosives act, and remand in custody pending trial.

Lancashire Police have 2 males charged in relation to a suspicious company and the manufacture of illicit drugs.

Northumbria Police acted upon intelligence and discovered chemicals, paraphernalia and traces of methamphetamine. That target has been charged with related offences.

Greater Manchester Police investigated numerous disseminations, resulting in one potential methamphetamine lab, one explosives "factory" and numerous recoveries of chemicals, relating to "experimentation" in explosives, sex, and drugs.

Derbyshire Police identified a large methamphetamine laboratory and then a hemp farm connected to that enquiry. Two targets are now pending charges.

Thames Valley Police received over 100 disseminations and are actively progressing over 20 as live enquiries including at least one methamphetamine laboratory.

Hampshire Police liaised in order to prove purchases of chemicals from this company had been made by customers In their area. Enfield was able to offer exhibited proof of purchase and postage, which was significant evidence enabling the eventual conviction and sentencing of 6 persons in relation to conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine, the leader receiving 10 years imprisonment.

Essex Police developed packages and a target has been charged with a "boxed" methamphetamine laboratory.

West Midlands Police identified and addressed a methamphetamine laboratory.

A methamphetamine laboratory was identified and addressed on a Scottish Isle.

Grampian Police investigated the death of a student purchasing chloroform from this company to assist in his suicide. The father of the student had intervened and instructed the company via the internet not to trade with his son fearing his intention. His son went on to purchase chloroform a second time and committed suicide.

Midlands Counter Terrorism Unit has investigated in relation to terrorism offences sufficient to charge.

In the USA, this project was described as being one of only two influences impacting on the small illicit laboratory production. (The second was changes to legislation.) 131 illicit laboratories have been directly attributed to this project, and others indirectly linked (i.e. chemicals passed to a third or fourth person).

The impact of this project has been huge. A small piece of intelligence highlighted a potential problem in an urban area where drug abuse was already prevalent. Despite the fact that legislation did not at that time favour straightforward intervention, the officers used imaginative and collaborative methods to achieve the positive outcome,

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and were dedicated in their approach.

It is not possible to assess how many people worldwide have been prevented from becoming addicted to methamphetamine, or what terrorism offences have been prevented by halting this company's supply of the chemicals required to manufacture drugs and explosives. The information from the US and the agencies listed above shows that had Cleveland Police not intervened, lives could well have been ruined or lost completely, both locally and elsewhere.

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**Section D: Endorsement by Senior Representative -** *Please insert letter from endorsing representative, this will not count towards your word or 1MB size limit restrictions.* 

Please find enclosed an application for consideration of the Tilley Problem Oriented Partnership Awards 2008, in relation to Operation Enfield.

Enfield was an intelligence led investigation that began in the Cleveland Police Force area, but developed to such an extent that it involved many partners across the UK and in countries abroad including the United States of America.

The application provides a comprehensive narrative of the investigation from the outset and in my judgment evidences very well the extent of partnership thinking and intervention on a global scale. If ever there was an example of effective Problem Oriented Policing in practice, this is it and the application has my full endorsement.

Yours faithfully

<u>Mark R. Braithwaite</u> <u>Detective Chief Superintendent</u> <u>Head of Crime Operations</u>

# Checklist for Applicants:

- 1. Have you read the process and application form guidance?
- 2. Have you completed all four sections of the application form in full including the endorsement from a senior representative?
- 3. Have you checked that your entry addresses all aspects of the judging criteria?
- 4. Have you advised all partner agencies that you are submitting an entry for your project?
- 5. Have you adhered to the formatting requirements within the guidance?
- 6. Have you checked whether there are any reasons why your project should **not** be publicised to other police forces, partner agencies and the general public e.g. civil or criminal proceedings pending in relation to your project?
- 7. Have you inserted your project name as a footer note on the application form? Go to View-Header and Footer to add it.
- 8. Have you saved you application form as a word document and entitled your message 'Tilley 08 entry (followed by project name in brackets)' before emailing it?

Once you are satisfied that you have completed your application form in full please email it to <u>Tilleyawards08@homeoffice.gsi.gov.uk</u>. One hard copy must also be posted to Alex Blackwell at Home Office, Effective Practice & Communication Team, 4th Floor, Fry Building (SE Quarter), 2 Marsham Street, London, SW1P 4DF and be received by 25<sup>th</sup> April 2008.