# INTRODUCTION

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Situational Crime Prevention (SCP) is a versatile approach that seeks to prevent criminal behavior by either implementing strategies to manipulate specific situations to make it impossible for the crime to be committed, or by reducing cues that increase a person's motivation to commit a crime during specific types of events. SCP's reach has expanded tremendously in recent years and the number of its techniques has increased from 12 to 25. Importantly, these techniques have been effectively applied to a variety of "new" crimes, such as identity theft, cyber crime, organized crime, and illegal migration, to name but a few. The prevalence of these new crimes has grown out of the new opportunities provided by globalization and the revolution in information technology (see Newman, this volume). This expansion continues to demonstrate the widely recognized practical relevance of SCP to solving crime problems. It also illustrates its unique ability as a theory of crime causation and control to understand the constantly changing environment of crime and the new opportunities for crime that emerge with these changes. It is little wonder, therefore, that SCP should

emerge as a significant approach to solving the problem of terrorism. It is an approach that is so practical and so focused on protecting individuals, locations and groups from victimization. It has *always* been primarily concerned with making our world safe and secure.

Why should it be any different when it comes to terrorism? Until recently, a major part of the approach to terrorism has been the province of political scientists, who, naturally, see terrorism as a political problem requiring a political solution. But international bodies such as the United Nations have been unable to agree on a definition of terrorism. This incapacity is quintessentially political. Indeed, the United States Government is unable to agree on a single definition, as various departments and agencies such as the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the State Department and the Defense Department have their own competing definitions (Freilich, Chermak and Simone, 2009). Although terrorism may appear to be a political problem, its solution does not necessarily lie in politics. In fact, it may be that thinking of terrorism solely in political terms inhibits one from understanding what it is, and worse, presupposes what should be done in response to it.

Clarke and Newman (2006) argued that we should approach terrorism *as if* it were crime, and break it down into its components and processes just as we do in SCP. Their definition (suggested by Nick Ross, a contributor to this volume) was that terrorism is crime with a political motive. Politicians and political scientists can argue whether those who carry out terrorist activities are criminals, murderers, freedom fighters or whatever else. The actual mechanics and operational constraints and contingencies are the same, no matter what political goal is being sought. Thus, as stated in Shane Johnson and Alex Braithwaite's chapter in this volume, the patterned activities of insurgent attacks are open to scientific analysis and discovery, which contribute to our understanding of how insurgents plan and carry out their attacks. Their chapter analyzes unique data from Iraq to examine the spatial and temporal patterns of both Improvised Explosive Device attacks (IED) and non-IED attacks. Johnson and Braithwaite found that both attack types clustered in space and time more than would be expected if their timing and location were independent. Following an attack at one location, other attacks were more likely nearby within a short interval of time, but the risk of attack within the vicinity diminished with time. Importantly, the precise patterns vary by attack type, suggesting that they are generated by different types of insurgent strategy and that different counter-insurgent tactics will therefore be appropriate for different types

of attack. The Johnson and Braithwaite study has the useful effect of demystifying terrorism by showing that terrorists face real-life challenges just like any other actors, and that their activities are dominated by primarily operational constraints and opportunities.

But if we must take sides against terrorists, and fight them, who better to tell us how to do this than military scientists whose specialty is fighting? Yet it is probably also true that the military establishments of many countries, especially those who have fought so many wars in Europe over the past century, have had great difficulty in adapting their standard approach to war. World War II brought this approach to its zenith: massive armies confronting each other in a defined field or location using massive firepower to overcome the other. Terrorists avoid this confrontation since they are weak in firepower. Instead, they use the strategies of "asymmetrical warfare." As Graeme Newman points out in his chapter, which links SCP to developing sensible foreign policy (demonstrating that terrorism is political after all), the tactics of terrorists are much enhanced by globalization, and especially by the information technology revolution. The British in Malaya were able, using dreadfully violent and Draconian methods, to wipe out insurgency in Malaya in the 1950s. Today, the portrayal of such violence by a Western democracy against such a small force would make such a strategy politically infeasible.

The U.S. invasion of Iraq was confronted with just such a problem. And it was in response to this problem of asymmetrical warfare that David Kilcullen wrote the "Twenty Eight Articles" paper reproduced (with permission) in this volume. Kilcullen, recipient of a Ph.D. in military science, and at the time adviser to General David H. Petraeus, the commander in Iraq, describes these articles as based on field notes he made while on duty in various operations dealing with insurgency (in Indonesia and other places). They clearly reflect an approach that is strikingly similar to situational crime prevention, among them the necessity of understanding the environment (cultural and physical) within which specific offences occur; identifying stakeholders (often women) and capable guardians (community leaders); reducing rewards of terrorists; understanding and identifying dangerous individuals (sometimes children); giving residents good positive reasons to side against the insurgents; explaining how to protect targets; identifying hotspots; and many more. In sum, these articles show how the collection and analysis of information is fundamental to a successful campaign, providing continuity in use of this information in a systematic way. The articles also demonstrate how difficult it is to convince command-

ing officers that insurgent activities can be more effectively overcome by the collection and use of information ( "intelligence") rather than by setting up a bastion in a walled compound from which patrols emerge briefly and then return. The problem faced in getting military commanders to think in terms of problem solving rather than firepower is not unlike the problem of getting police chiefs to think in terms of problem-oriented policing (which is closely related to SCP) rather than the single solution they commonly use to solve all crime problems – arrest.

Among the great fears of terrorism after 9/11 was the fear of weapons of mass destruction. Politicians cried, "we can't protect everything" – yet in the U.S. particularly, politicians continued to proceed on just that basis, distributing homeland security money according to standard political practices (i.e., to gain political favors) with little regard to identifying what targets really needed to be protected. Building on Clarke and Newman's (2006) "EVIL DONE" diagnosis of the inherent but differential attractiveness of targets to terrorists, Rachel Boba's chapter develops a plan for systematically assessing what targets are most likely to be attacked. It is true that we cannot protect everything – but neither can terrorists attack just any target, since they too have limited resources. They must select the target that suits their operational capacity. So it turns out that we have to protect just those targets that are most likely to be attacked. Boba's paper shows how to do it.

The target risk assessment approach does much to allay the irrational fears of ordinary people and their local community leaders, who harbor fears of suffering an imminent attack (constantly reminded by the terrorist threat levels broadcast by the federal government). However, it does little to allay the overwhelming fear of Armageddon, the death and destruction that could be wrought by a weapon of mass destruction. Even here, the rational approach of problem solving makes clear that these fears could mostly be unfounded, and that an attack by a terrorist group using a weapon of mass destruction is unlikely. And the reason? Terrorists do not have the resources or the operational know-how to do it. William Clark, an immunologist and widely read science writer, reveals in his chapter the specific steps that a terrorist group must take to acquire, manufacture and then disperse a biological weapon. He convincingly demonstrates that using such a weapon is (and has been) certain to result in failure for the terrorists. In fact, we know that the overwhelming preference for conventional weapons – small arms and explosives – by terrorists is the result of their widespread availability. Almost all terrorist attacks have used

conventional weapons, and in situations where they have not – Clark's examples center on biological weapons – they have fallen far short of their objective. It might be argued that the 9/11 attacks were unconventional and highly successful. But in fact, these attacks used airplanes as weapons, a technique available and used since World War I. The 9/11 attacks are better described as an innovative use of conventional weapons, in the same way as roadside bombs and suicide bombing are an innovative use of conventional weaponry.

The step-by-step approach to uncovering the steps necessary to carry out a biological attack, as exemplified in Clark's paper, has been advocated by situational crime preventionists for some time. In particular, the seminal paper by Cornish (1994) outlined the "script" approach to understanding how offenders carry out their tasks. The script concept is a logical outcome of the rational choice approach to understanding and explaining crime, and it has been used to explain a variety of crimes, in particular credit card and check fraud (Mativat and Tremblay, 1997; Lacoste and Tremblay, 2003), child sexual abuse (Wortley and Smallbone, 2006), and suicide bombing (Clarke and Newman, 2006). Minwoo Yun's chapter presents a case study of hostage taking in Afghanistan. It convincingly demonstrates that the script approach can help not only in understanding the operational constraints and advantages of hostage taking by terrorists, but also in offering points of intervention and tactical suggestions for negotiation. However, examining the sequence of events that leads up to a terrorist attack can also reveal unexpected links among what might otherwise be considered unrelated events. For example, the Oklahoma City bomber Timothy McVeigh was tracked down, in large part, because of a traffic violation.

The paper by Joshua Freilich and Steven Chermak applies the script method to two case studies that involve far-rightists fatally attacking law enforcement personnel in the United States. The case studies are used heuristically to demonstrate the vitality and effectiveness of both traditional "hard" SCP measures (that prevent an offender from successfully completing a desired illegal act), as well as recently proposed "soft" strategies (that prevent cues or prompts from occurring that might further inflame a suspect's motivation or ideology during a specific incident). Their chapter illustrates that SCP is concerned with analyzing all aspects of a particular incident, including ideological issues. The consistent hallmark of situational crime prevention, though, is to analyze all factors through a "prevention" lens, as opposed to taking a "root causes" approach.

The chapter by Roberta Belli and Joshua Freilich focuses on ideologically motivated tax refusal, a nonviolent crime committed by far-right extremists in the U.S. Recent research has demonstrated that antecedent events, including violent and nonviolent acts, may be important indicators of the path taken by terrorists to an attack – the "pre-phase" as Yun calls it. Similarly, some have speculated that nonviolent offenses, such as the refusal to comply with tax laws as a form of anti-government protest, may act as a gateway to "escalating" illegal behavior that includes violent acts. Belli and Freilich's innovative study expands SCP's counterterrorism reach and applies it to the non-violent – but politically motivated crime of tax refusal (Newman & Clarke, 2006). Their study opens up many opportunities for groundbreaking research, considering that the vast majority of terrorism definitions and research limit its universe of cases to acts that involve force or violence (Freilich, Chermak and Simone, 2009). Their paper also demonstrates that the rational choice model and SCP strategies can be effectively applied not just to the more typical crimes of commission, but to crimes of omission (where non-action is the crime) as well. The chapter thus makes important contributions to both the rational choice/SCP and terrorism literatures.

What is most remarkable about the collection of papers in this volume is their diversity of style, the contrasting backgrounds of the authors and the different disciplines represented in their approach. Some chapters were written specifically for this volume by seasoned academics whose background in situational crime prevention or crime science is well known. Others were papers that emerged from conferences on terrorism or crime prevention. The chapter by Joseph Clare and Frank Morgan, for example, had its beginnings at a 2007 conference in Perth, Australia on terrorism and torture, where Clarke and Newman presented their ideas on applying situational crime prevention to the problem of terrorism. Clare and Morgan later refined and presented their paper at the 17th Annual Environmental Criminology and Crime Analysis conference in July 2008, and eventually developed it into a more formal chapter for this volume. Of particular interest, though, is its crossing over to another discipline, in this case the epidemiology of disease, to show how recent developments in applying situational crime prevention to terrorism have seemingly broken the "rule of specificity" so ardently promoted by the traditional SCP approach.

The chapter by Nick Ross originated at an international conference sponsored by John Jay College of Criminal Justice in Puerto Rico in June 2008. The presentation made by Ross, a seasoned journalist and television

commentator, was so dramatic that we asked for few modifications of it in order to preserve its powerful format. But don't be deceived by the non-academic style of the writing. Ross, a prime mover in the establishment of the Jill Dando Institute for Crime Science at University College London, relentlessly applies the problem-solving logic that is the hallmark of situational crime prevention to uncovering the errors made by politicians and social scientists in responding to terrorism. Interestingly, Ross's chapter takes us full circle as he demonstrates that the SCP measures employed by the British government "bought" it time as it wore the Irish Republican Army down. This in turn increased the willingness of the IRA to negotiate the ceasefire with the British government. In other words, advocates of taking seriously the ideology and grievances of aggrieved parties may have the most to benefit from SCP techniques. Indeed, successfully implemented SCP techniques may be one of the most effective mechanisms that make negotiated settlements possible.

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