

Problem Solving Quarterly

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Police Lead Effort to Improve Safety of Popular Night Spot

By John Middleton Hope

Electric Avenue—"The Place to Go"

During the mid 1980s, an area of Calgary (Alberta, Canada) developed a reputation as 'the place to go' for entertainment. By the 1988 Olympic Winter Games, a number of bars had opened in a one-and-a-half-block section of 11th Ave. SW; the area became known as 'Electric Avenue.' As many as 10,000 people congregated nightly in search of a good time. Crime on Electric Avenue increased disproportionately to crime in other areas. The area became the focal point of a new phenomenon—spontaneous celebrations after major sporting events.

Twenty-four bars were licensed in the area, which was bordered by an inner-city residential community. Opportunistic bar operators joined responsible bar owners at

the avenue, and a competition for revenue began, especially as businesses anticipated a windfall with the Winter Olympics. Other businesses moved away due to the noise, crime and filth that became the trademark of this area.

An increase in violent crime accompanied the growing popularity of Electric Avenue as the site of large celebratory gatherings. The violence, in the form of countless nightly assaults, disturbances and several robberies, culminated in the summer of 1992 with the separate homicides of two young people.

The surrounding residential community was most impacted by this problem, although the entire city suffered, and this area required more and more police presence. Increased noise, garbage, parking complaints, property damage, and thefts were all directly attributable to the rise in popularity of the avenue. Many of these offenses were an annoyance, but when: some residents were robbed and assaulted. The community became so antagonistic toward all the businesses on the avenue.

By 1992, it was estimated that the cost of policing this block-and-a

(cont. on p. 6)

Due to Police Response, Apartment Residents No Longer Live in Fear

By Robert Bennett, John Bryant and 'golfer' Dtgen

Scanning

Over the past several years, incidents of violent crime at the Creston Apartments in Kansas City (MO) increased dramatically.

The police department received numerous complaints and calls for service from residents and neighbors about drug dealing, homicides, assaults, robberies,

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prostitution, and theft. In addition to these calls, the department also received verbal and written requests from city, state and federal officials to address the growing problem of violence at the Creston.

As of July 1993, the Creme was the number one location within the division of calls for police service, averaging 55 calls per month. Police officers spent hundreds of hours answering these calls every month. The calls not only caused problems for the officers, but also deprived citizens in other areas of the city of routine police patrol.

[The Creston was the number one location within the division of calls for police service.]

As time passed, offenders became more bold and violent, putting responding officers in greater danger each time they went to the location. Because the number of violent acts and assaults on police officers grew, the department began sending four police officers on each call. Two officers remained outside, ensuring the safety of their vehicles, while two officers responded inside to the call.

Residents of the Creston Apartments, especially those raising children, were the primary victims of the crime and disorder. These residents lived in an environment unfit for human occupancy—a building infested with mice, rats and roaches. They also had to co-exist with drug dealers making transactions 24 hours a day, seven days a week. For the residents, unfit living conditions, drugs, violence, and criminal activity were part of daily life.

Other area residents were also affected by the problems in the apartment complex. The area around the Creston Apartments consisted mostly of three-story Victorian-style homes with occupants in the medium-income bracket. Families with small children occupied many of the homes. The violent acts, gunfire and drug activity originating from the Creston often took place right in front of their homes. This illegal activity, along with an increase in residential burglaries, drove real estate values down and homeowner's insurance up. The residents felt like prisoners in their own homes, building privacy fences and buying watch dogs to protect their families. They refused to allow their children to play outside without supervision.

With these problems in mind, the police started a problem-oriented policing project at the Creston Apartments, with the objective of stopping drug sales and use, ending the violent crime and allowing residents to live in a better environment.

Analysts

The officers collected information from a variety of sources, including apartment residents, police records, tax and ownership records, and observations of the apartments.

The first step was to collect reports taken by officers at the Creston in the previous six months, and to obtain a computer printout detailing the nature of the calls. Thus, the most frequent types of calls and the people involved were identified. The majority of calls dealt with drug dealing in and around the building.

The officers went to the residents of the Creston and the surrounding community for help in gathering information on drug activity. Residents and neighbors received business cards with a pager number where police could be reached 24 hours a day. The police officers' candor with residents saved them confidence in the police, and the residents agreed to provide information. As people called, officers identified subjects involved and the times of heaviest activity.

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Over several weeks, the officers collected and forwarded this information to the Street Narcotics Unit, to assist them in making undercover narcotics buys.

The police contacted the owner of an abandoned building across the street from the Creston and requested his help. He agreed to allow officers to conduct surveillance from his building; however, the only way in was the front door. This posed a problem, as even the most naive drug dealer would notice uniformed police officers carrying video equipment into an abandoned building. The police department called on the fire department for help. The fire department shed an emergency call, sending pumpers, ladder trucks and fire personnel to the abandoned building. In the midst of this activity, police officers entered the building and set up video equipment without being noticed.

(*cont on p. 5*)

Temporary Restraining Order Keeps Prostitutes Off Streets

By Gary 'sus

Scanning

The Midway/Rosecrans area of San Diego was known as the 'Glitter Track' of the West Coast. The area had the appearance of an open-air eel market. Each night, approximately eight to 25 prostitutes openly solicited men who lined up on various side streets.

Traditional law enforcement methods had only limited success and were highly expensive.

Businesses and citizens living in the vicinity complained to politicians and the police department about the prostitutes. Responding officers contacted the women, field interviewed them, and arrested or cited them when possible. Politicians requested information on the problem and the police response.

Analysis

Analysis began with the question, Why Midway Drive? Midway Drive between Rosecrans and West Point Loma Blvd. is almost exclusively a commercial business area. The area does not look run-down or decayed.

While most vehicle traffic was legitimate, it also provided camouflage for those seeking prostitutes. Even after the retail businesses closed in the evening, Ebert were

enough adult entertainment business, bars and liquor stores open to provide valid reasons for lone males to drive in the area. Each business at/dor strip mall had its own driveway, and most had their own parking too. This provided countless areas where 'johns' could park, blend in with other vehicles and commit illegal sex acts.

The division next looked at the prostitutes themselves, of which there were two groups. One group—the 'circuit girls'—always worked for a pimp. They traveled from city to city, staying in an area only as long as it was profitable. They left only after they had been arrested several times and their court data were approaching, or after they had failed to appear in court and warrants had been issued. In San Diego, due to the lack of jail space for females, the 'circuit girls' stayed in spite of numerous warrants because officers had no way to get them into court.

The second group of prostitutes working the area were local women. Most had family in San Diego; many had grown up locally or had lived there for a number of years.

The prostitutes working Midway were not drug addicts. They were in business to make easy money to support their pimps and their babies, not to support drug habits.

At any given time after 9 p.m., eight to 14 officers patrolled a five-block stretch of Midway. While that allotment of manpower did suppress prostitution activity, it did not eliminate the problem.

The vice unit had tried to curtail prostitution with their 'john' details. Hundreds of men were ar-

rested by undercover vice officers posing as prostitutes, but the arrests had no noticeable effect on the number of men baiting for prostitutes on Midway Drive. Efforts to get the local newspapers to print the names of those arrested were fruitless.

Vice also spent countless hours trying to catch the prostitutes to solicit their undercover male officers. A vice sergeant stated, 'The girls on Midway are just too smart. They know all the detectives. We can spend a maximum amount of time and only get minimal results.'

Upon completing analysis, the police concluded that traditional law enforcement methods had only limited success and were highly expensive. Massive allotments of manpower in the area did curtail prostitution, but as the division reallocated officers, the prostitutes returned.

While [the police department's] allotment of manpower did suppress prostitution activity, it did not terminate the problem.

The lack of jail space also limited the effectiveness of the traditional approach. Without the ability to incarcerate, the officers could not impact the ability of the women to make money. A ticket or fine simply meant more time on the street to make up the difference.

Response

The police could do little to change the geography of the Midway/Rosecrans neighborhood. Any changes a business might make

(cont. on p. 10)

Front-Line Officers Awarded for Creative Responses to Crime

At the Fifth Annual International Problem-Oriented Policing Conference, held Nov. 2-4, 1994, in La Jolla, California, PERT recognized six individuals and six teams for their outstanding problem-solving projects. Three of the projects are summarized in this issue of Problem Solving Quarterly.

PERF congratulates the following recipients of the Herman Goldstein Excellence in Problem Solving Award:

TEAM WINNER

Kanna City (MO) Police Department
Officers Robert Bennett, John Bryant and hailer Degen

TEAM HONORABLE MENTIONS

Edmonton (Canada) Police Service
Sgt. Dave Bell and Detectives Ken Mackay, Colin Milton and Jack Tetz

Hamilton-Wentworth (Canada) Police Department
Officers Kenneth Bond, Stewart Jones and Scott Rusin

LaCrosse (WI) Police Department
Lt. Andrew Truscott, Sgt. Brad Burke, Officer Pat Hogan, Sgt. Glen Kioss, Sgt. Kathy Larson, Officer Pat Marco, Sgt. Dan Marcou, Officer Brian Poem, and Officer Jeffrey Reberg

San Diego (CA) Police Department
Officers Cindy Brady and Tim Hail

San Diego (CA) Police Department
Sgt. Gary Jaus and Officers Scott Career and Frank Hernandez

INDIVIDUAL WINNER

Sgt. John Middleton Hope
Calgary (Canada) Police Service

INDIVIDUAL HONORABLE MENTIONS

Officer Peter Collins
Austin (TX) Police Department
Constable Lew Evans-Davies
Edmonton (Canada) Police Service
Officer Cynthia Johnson
Charlotte-Mecklenburg (NC) Police Department
Constable Sue Olsen
Edmonton (Canada) Police Service
Deputy R. D. Williams
Sacramento County (CA) *Sheriffs* Department

Submissions

The editor of Problem-Solving Quarterly encourages readers to send in articles on their problem-oriented policing efforts. When submitting *deacriptioos*, discuss *the four phases of yow effort--* scanning, analysis, response, and assessment. It may help to answer the following questions:

- *What is the* problem?
- Who was affected by the problem, *and bow*?
- How has the department handled the problem in the past?
- What information was collected about *the* problem, and from what sources?
- What was the goal of *the* problem-solving effort?
- *What strategies* were developed to reach that goal?
- What agencies assisted the police department in achieving the goal?
- Was the goal accomplished?
- *What would you recommend* to other agencies interested in addressing similar problems?

Send submissions to
Problem-Solving Quarterly
1120 Connecticut Avenue NW
Suite 930
Washington, DC 20036
(202) 466-7820
FAX (202) 466-7826

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The officers videotaped numerous drug transactions, with the dealers unaware that the police were just 73 feet away, watching and taping their *every move*. After a transaction, officers conducted pedestrian checks or walk checks on the parties involved.

The resulting videotape not only helped the police to respond to drug dealing, but also helped to mobilize other parties in response to the problem. Local television stations broadcast portions of the tape as part of their coverage of the problems at the Creston.

To address the physical decay of the apartments, officers contacted the owners of the building, who were uncooperative and unwilling to work with the police. Tax records revealed that the Creston was a HUD-subsidized facility. A HUD lien on the building made HUD just as responsible as the owners.

Response

The video surveillance allowed for better identification of drug dealers, and thus facilitated the arrest and/or eviction of the people primarily responsible for drug activity at the Creston.

The police department provided the Jackson County Drug Abatement Response Team (DART), the fire marshal and the health inspector with copies of reports from the Creston and a copy of the videotape. After they inspected the building, they served the owners with numerous fire code and health code violations.

The department also contacted the regional director for HUD and

advised him of the situation. He attended meetings with DART and the Longfellow Community Association (which included Creston residents), and was in contact with HUD's Washington office about the deplorable conditions at the Creston. An inspection by HUD official soon followed. Engineers determined that the building had deteriorated to a point beyond repair.

The department solicited support from Rep. Alan Wheat and Sec. Christopher Bond. Bond met with the police, the community association, HUD, and DART and promised to cut through the red tape as soon as he returned to Washington.

Cams for peace service dropped over 60 percent Drug clearing ceased, and violent crime was nearly nonexistent.

The HUD regional director then advised the police that HUD had allocated funds to improve living conditions at the Creston, and requested assistance in devising a plan of action.

The project's initial goal was to restore the Creston to a safe living environment, but engineers determined that to make the building structurally sound would be too expensive. Basic improvements would make the building safe to live in and relocation of occupants was complete and the building destroyed.

HUD officials replaced the managers of the Creston with a management group willing to cooperate with the police. The new managers corrected all fire code

violations, attempted for insects and rodents, and made cosmetic repairs to the building. HUD also provided 24-hour security, consisting of two off-duty police officers and four armed security guards patrolling the interior and exterior of the building. Security was also increased with the installation of a metal detector at the main entrance and the reinforcement of all other entrances. People entering the building had to pass through the metal detector and display picture identification.

Assessment

The Creston Apartments are now closed and the building scheduled for demolition. HUD successfully relocated all residents.

Before the apartments were shut down, life at the Creston improved dramatically. The known drug dealers were jailed on narcotics charges or moved from the apartments after receiving eviction notices. Calls for police service dropped over 60 percent. Drug dealing ceased, and violent crime in the surrounding community was nearly nonexistent. The residents of the building and neighborhood were finally able to live without fear of violence and drugs, and happily adjusted to their new way of life.

The officers who once spent hundreds of hours answering calls at the Creston apartments are now able to devote their time to other areas.

Robert Bennett, John Bryant and Jenifer Degas are police officers with the Kansas City (MO) Police Department.

(Elredtir *Are., co,u. fi o,n p. 1*)

half was over \$1 million annually. Police officers found it highly stressful to patrol this area, as they had hundreds of nightly confrontations with intoxicated and aggressive patrons. During the summer of 1992, 16 police officers were assaulted.

Responses to these problems lacked coordination and consistency among police, residents, businesses, and government agencies. The police reacted to the environment instead of controlling it. The various other agencies involved (e.g. planning, licensing, liquor, and gambling boards) operated in isolation but made decisions that frequently impacted on the work of another agency. As a result, many of their initiatives were ineffective because they addressed a part of the problem, rather than the whole problem.

Pace Collect Information to Pinpoint Problems

An in-depth analysis of crime trends identified serious problems with street robberies, auto thefts, vehicle damage, and drunken disturbances. For example, statistics on criminal activity in the first four months of 1991 revealed that street robberies increased by 59 percent and auto thefts increased by 139 percent compared with the same period in 1990. In the summers of 1991 and 1992, calls for service averaged 900 to 1,100 per month.

Police collected information from both residents and business owners about the problems on Electric Avenue. In open 'Town Hall' meetings, residents cited the following problems: all-night noise from loud patrons, squealing tires, and blaring music; constant gar-

bage an the avenue and in the surrounding residential area; and property damage to homes, vehicles and businesses.

By 1992, it was estimated that the cost of poking this block-a-d-e h&f was over \$1 million annually.

The 22 police officers in the area cited a number of problems, including a lack of cooperation among businesses and government agencies operating in the area. This problem became evident as the police invited business owners, residents and government agencies to voice their concerns and help respond to problems through the '11th Avenue Business Association.' Some agencies did not choose to participate fully, and the police service determined that a lack of communication between agencies, businesses and residents was a major problem.

The police employed three research students from Mount Royal College to conduct a demographic study of the patrons who frequented the avenue. This background information was used to formulate responses to problems. (An example of how police used this information to respond to street robberies appears later in this article.)

Police Fatigue COOT-Plat-d R9S-O--SB

The police decided not only to enforce the law, but also, more importantly, to coordinate the efforts of others, based on a model of interactive policing in which those affected by the problem participate in finding a solution.

The police service spearheaded an effort to get all of the involved entities--businesses, residents and government--to work together. Most of these entities had no idea that they were part of the problem. The police realised that a successful response required several representatives from all areas to buy into a problem-solving approach. The previous way of doing things--isolated response to individual problems--was not working.

The police commander went directly to the police chief, who asked the mayor to call a meeting of some 26 departments and agencies, including the Police Commission. A task force was created and given responsibility for developing strategies to address problems.

The task force comprised representatives from the police, planning, licensing, fire, and law departments; the Provincial Liquor Board; and the bars on Electric Avenue. They developed a 'Three Impact Approach,' dividing the problems into three areas--architectural, regulatory and operational.

The group drafted legislation that resulted in infrastructure spending of over \$800,000 to redesign the avenue with a Crime Prevention Through Environmental Design (CPTED) concept in mind. In addition, they drafted an Area Redevelopment Plan, which was passed by the city council and regulated any new development on Electric Avenue. This plan became an important tool in regulating the bars that were the source of recurring problems requiring police intervention.

The problem-solving approach was used over a three-year period to deal with the multiple problems.

(continued on p. 7)

(*Electric Avenue*, cont. from p. 6)

The 22 officers working the zone developed individual problem-solving plans addressing a host of issues, such as noise abatement, drunken behavior, traffic enforcement, and violent crime. The officers were allowed to select those problems that most interested them, and they were given time-fines in which to complete research on their problem and develop a response strategy.

Example--The Plan to Reduce Street Robberies

One problem-solving program used the SARA (scanning, analysis, response, assessment) model to address street robberies.

Scanning--Crime statistics indicated a significant increase in street robberies between 1990 and 1991. The zone in which Electric Avenue is located had a 9 percent to 92 percent higher incidence of street robberies compared with other zones in the city.

Analysis--Increased pedestrian and vehicular traffic and poor lighting provided opportunities for thieves to target unsuspecting victims. Victim profiles revealed that the majority of victims were white males between the ages of 20 and 40. Many reported robberies occurred in an area called the 'Gay Stroll', though not all victims were members of the gay community. A significant portion of victims were senior citizens living in or visiting the area.

Eighty percent of robberies occurred Monday through Thursday, with most occurring on Thursday. Most robberies took place after 8 p.m. Sixty-nine percent of attacks occurred in one area of five square

blocks. The consistency of time and place led officers to conclude that the same culprits were committing many robberies.

Response--Officers worked with businesses to facilitate target hardening on their premises. They focused on the areas of highest incidence, gathering additional analytical information about victims and perpetrators. Armed with this additional information, plain-clothes officers reentered those areas to observe and intercede in or prevent robberies.

The police led by example, empowering the community...to become involved in decision making.

After this initial short-term response, officers planned to implement various support programs, such as block watches and citizen education, to empower residents to prevent street robberies.

Assessment--Between the summer of 1992 and the summer of 1993, street robberies in the zone declined by 73 percent. The response to street robberies is just one of many problem-solving plans focused on a particular problem.

Media Attention Helps to Garner Community Support

Throughout the three-year campaign to improve Electric Avenue, the police, via the media, brought the situation to the attention of municipal and provincial governments and Calgary citizens, with the intention of forcing the community, politicians and businesses to sit up and take notice.

In 1991, the police began reporting on the problems. Drawing attention to the situation was a calculated gamble, as the community then looked to the police service to solve the problems they had pointed out. The police led by example, empowering the community, including the businesses, to become involved in decision making.

Decreased Crime Rate Testifies to Success of Project

As a result of problem solving by police and others in the community, violent and property crimes, complaints, and complaints and assaults against police officers have decreased. Problem solving initiatives developed for Electric Avenue are being successfully used in other areas of the city. A major architectural facelift communicates a spirit of respect for people and property. A Coordinated Response Team, originally formed to respond to Electric Avenue's problems, now responds to problems in other city neighborhoods.

Calls for service in the area have declined substantially. The summers of 1993 and 1994 averaged 650 to 750 calls per month and 500 to 650 calls per month, respectively. This was a substantial decline from the average of 900 to 1,100 calls per square in the two previous summers.

Between the summers of 1992 and 1993 (when crime is highest), crime rates declined dramatically. Homicides declined from two to zero, and assaults on police officers declined from 16 to zero. Other assaults de-

(cont. on p. 8)

SARA Needs an "M"

By John Lssardi

The SARA model—analysis, response, and assessment—has driven police problem-solving efforts. As an acronym, SARA provides a handy memory device for a step-by-step analytical problem-solving model. However, in a field problem-solving model, SARA needs an 'M' for maintenance.

The SARA acronym has cast in concrete the four problem-solving steps it articulates, sometimes making it difficult for officers and administrators to look beyond them. A problem-solver begins a project with the goal of eliminating or reducing a problem, hoping to end the process as quickly as possible and receive some recognition along the way. When the problem

(Electric Ave., mu. from p. 7)

increased by 92 percent, disturbances by 49 percent and, as mentioned above, street robberies by 73 percent.

From their experience with Electric Avenue, the police, community, politicians, pumas, and government agencies have learned that a cooperative and proactive effort geared toward problem solving is more effective than a reactive approach.

John Middleton-Hope is a sergeant with the Calgary Police Service.

is 'solved,' officers hand in required paperwork, if any, and move on.

Now that we know that [problem solving] works, it's time to monitor more closely the durability and long-term effects of our efforts.

The resulting paper trail is necessary for documenting members of problem-solving efforts and their successes. Numbers have been useful in demonstrating that problem-solving works. Now that we know it works, it's time to monitor more closely the durability and long-term effectiveness of our efforts.

In the final step of the SARA model—we ask, 'Did our effort work?' If the answer is no, we revisit analysis to learn why. If the answer is yes, then our project is over. What's next? Colleagues tell me, 'We move on to something else.' I say we need an 'M' for maintenance.

A maintenance system capable of monitoring post-problem-solving activity would allow us to intervene at the first sign that a problem is resurfacing. After reviewing 300 projects that took place in San Diego over a three-year period, I saw that many were at the same location. Officers rarely consulted officers or documentation from previous projects when they undertook a new problem-solving project. New projects are valued; revisiting old problem locations is often unfairly perceived as a failure of the previous problem-solving project.

A maintenance system should focus as managing problem locations over time and be operated at the supervisory level. It would not be fair to burden the original problem-solver with main-

Human nature would tempt officers away from projects, especially complicated ones, if they were expected to commit to projects beyond the resolution of the current problem. A tickler system

that field managers determine on problem locations would allow timely assignment of maintenance projects if a problem showed signs of re-emerging. A tickler system project would need to have the same status as new projects if we are to sustain progress.

A maintenance system capable of monitoring

activity would allow us to intervene at the first sign that a problem is resurfacing.

Ultimately, the value of problem-solving projects lies not in their quantity, but in how effectively they contribute to long-term community improvements and crime reduction. A maintenance system is one way to ensure that the positive results of problem-solving efforts are not lost over time.

John Lssardi is a sergeant with the San Diego (CA) Police Department and is currently serving as PERF's problem-oriented With* coordinator.

Reducing School Crime by Building Student Involvement

Forty years ago, tardiness, talkative students and gum chewing were the most pressing problems faced by public school teachers. Today, however, teachers and students must worry about assault, robbery, gang violence, and drug dealing and use, all of which threaten them in and around their schools. Indeed, even a decade ago, the National Institute of Education discovered that in a typical one-month period,

- 282,000 students and 5,200 teachers were physically attacked, with 4 percent of students and 19 percent of teachers requiring medical attention;
- 112,000 students and 6,000 teachers were robbed;
- 2.4 million students and 128,000 teachers had property stolen from them while at school;
- One out of every 10 schools was broken into, a rate five times higher than that for commercial places of business; and
- over 25 percent of schools were vandalized, at an estimated cost of over 5600 million per year.

In large cities with populations of over 500,000, the problems in high schools were even greater. In those cities, the findings from the Safe School Study indicated that

- about 7 percent of the high school students stayed at home at least one day each month out of fear;
- approximately 24 percent of students avoided three or more places at school because of fear of being victimized;
- over 29 percent of teachers were threatened with physical harm each month; and
- over 28 percent of teachers hesitated in the previous month to confront misbehaving students for fear for their own safety.

Students, teachers and police officers work together to identify and solve problems on a high school campus.

By the end of the 1980s, the American School Health Association reported further that 2 percent of students (approximately 338,000 nationwide) reported carrying a handgun to school at least once a year, a third of those carried a pistol daily. About eight times as many students said they carried knives. The potential for violence is obviously great, as abated by the fact that over a third of 10th graders reported that someone had threatened to hurt them while they were at school.

The Consequences of School Crime

The threat of crime at school has consequences that go beyond the crimes themselves. A positive school experience is a major factor in helping young people to develop

into productive, law-abiding members of our society. Without a safe and secure environment, it becomes virtually impossible for the school to provide a positive social atmosphere. Recently, the President's Working Group on School Violence and Discipline noted that in such environments, even those students who are worried and desire to learn will find it difficult due to fear and distractions (Office of Education & Justice and Delinquency Prevention = 1986). The committee went on to affirm that an orderly school environment is essential to the learning process, while suggesting that the disorder in some American schools is sufficiently severe to cripple the educational process. With such conditions, we may be producing a generation at risk.

Responses in Charlotte

Recognizing that the police alone are unable to provide sufficient protection for students, many public school districts have begun to take more active steps—both alone and in cooperation with local police. The Charlotte-Mecklenburg County School District, responsible for educating the youth in Charlotte, N.C., the nation's 35th largest city, began such efforts in 1992. Further, the leadership of that district, aware of the trend toward community policing in many municipal departments, has designed a school safety program based on the principle that police must work with the community to produce public safety and a better quality of life. Introduction of that program began in the 1994-1995 academic year.

The program in Charlotte relies on a process whereby students, teachers and police officers work together to identify and solve problems (see our p. 1J)

(Postlittka, cont. from p. 3)

(e.g., fences, lighting, private security) would be expensive, counterproductive to business and of limited value. Also, any geographic response would have to *it* throughout the entire business community, or the prostitutes would simply move to the next lot or side street.

In 1993, in another neighborhood within the division, an officer used the fast known wheat-misted, civil neighborhood restraining order against a drug-addicted, mentally ill woman who had terrorized the community for over a year.

[The defendants] Were prohibited from engaging in behavior that lends itself to prostitution.

Two officers applied the neighborhood restraining order concept to the Midway Drive prostitution problem. The only difference was that instead of having multiple plaintiffs and one defendant, the officers sought to line up multiple plaintiffs (area businesses) against multiple defendants (prostitutes).

Officers used high-visibility patrol, undercover surveillance and shared intelligence to develop accurate profiles of the prostitutes consistently on Midway. They compiled a list of 69 prostitute; who frequented the area.

Next, the officers took their idea to a judge, asking him to research the legality of a restraining order involving multiple plaintiffs and multiple defendants. The judge advised them that the idea appeared to be legally sound. The

judge also informed the officers that the order would be a single restraining order rather than multiple orders. This helped the officers to pitch the idea of a started business community to subsequent plaintiffs.

The officers contacted about 35 babes owners, mows and landlords on Midway Drive, explaining their plan and asking each to be part of the area temporary restraining order (TRO). Twenty-eight businesses agreed to the plan. Each plaintiff Liminess documented problems or damage they had suffered as a result of prostitution. Problems included littering on the property (used condoms, underwear and trash); vandalism; loss of customers; changes in business hours (closing earlier); and an imitated number of employees working the late shift for added protection. Hotels reported families leaving after one night because prostitutes knocked on their doors.

The standard TRO requires the defendants to remain at least 100 yards away from the plaintiff. The officers had at least one plaintiff every 100 yards. They also had plaintiffs on every corner, to prevent the prostitutes from simply moving around the corner.

While the officers were in the process of obtaining the TRO, the City of San Diego spent its long-awaited jail for females, with immediate results. The number of prostitutes dropped, as several left town or kid low — nil they had enough to cover all their outstanding warrants. After two weeks, the number of prostitutes rose slightly, as the women cleared up their warrants or were released from custody pending new court dates, but it still remained lower than it had previously been.

The officers obtained the TRO against 31 prostitutes. Of the initial 31 named defendants, officers located and served 24 with their TRO paperwork. Sixteen of the 24 showed up in court two weeks later to contest the order. After hearing arguments from both the prostitutes and the officers, the judge upheld the TRO against 23 of the 24. The judge also upheld the TRO against the eight women who chose not to show up in court to contest the order (a standard procedure).

Those crimes directly attributable to prostitution, such as grand theft (person), pickpocketing and vandalism completely disappeared.

The judge explained to the defendants that they were not prevented from being in the Midway area. They were, however, prohibited from engaging in the behavior that lends itself to prostitution (flagging down motorists, loitering on corners, repeatedly walking up and down the street, etc.).

Any violations of the order would result in an immediate five days in jail and a \$1,000 fine, while subsequent violations would double the jail time and the fine. The judge's statements had credibility in light of the recently opened woman's jail.

Assessment

The TRO had immediate and positive results. For the first month after the TRO, the roadsides disappeared from Midway. Since then, there have been two or fewer

(cont. out p. 11)

(Prostitution, cont. from p. 10)

prostitutes sighted on any given night. Not one prostitute has been arrested for violating the Midway order.

Follow-up interviews with several businesses have revealed a marked improvement. One hotel reported that profits increased 15 to 20 percent. Families are staying in hotels for more than just one night. Every business has reported increased revenue, or at least a safer business climate.

Crimes directly attributable to prostitution, such as grand theft (person), pickpocketing and vandalism, have completely disappeared. The circuit pimps, the local gang member pimps and the 'johns' no longer cruise Midway Drive. Vehicle traffic and cabs cruising the area have noticeably decreased.

Of the 69 prostitutes originally documented, the TRO only applied to 24 of them. One might expect other circuit prostitutes or local women to fill the void, but that has not happened. Obviously, the impact went beyond the 24 served and spread to the prostitute/pimp subculture at large. That was the intent in identifying and serving both the circuit women and the local prostitutes.

In this situation, officers analyzed the problem and identified factors they could change and those they could not. The police and business community formed a partnership in civil court to accomplish what neither party could accomplish on its own.

Gary Jaus is a sergeant with the San Diego (CA) Police Department

(Schools, cont. from p. 9)

lams on a high school campus. In most respects, the *cos differs little from other problem solving efforts, with the exception that the community is a school rather than a neighborhood.

Expected results of the... program include reductions in crime, delinquency and vandalism rates.

Students devote one to two classes per week to participation in problem-solving VOWS. Each group makes use of the SARA model of problem-oriented policing, though the model has been modified considerably for application. Students generally perform the following activities during the four-stage problem-solving process:

Scenarios—Groups identify and discuss school issues and decide which to address. After determining group structure and guidelines, the students collect information on school problems, making use of their own knowledge, supplemented by surveys, interviews and their own analysis of school and other official data.

Analysis—Students further refine the problems to be addressed. Together they look at the information available and brainstorm about possible response strategies. They may choose to attempt to eliminate the problem(s) altogether, reduce the harm caused by the problem(s) or devise alternative responses to the problem(s).

Response—Students implement responses based on the brainstorming sessions. They choose one or

more responses, then call on their peers, faculty, school administrators, parents, police, and others in the community for support. Response may evaluate on the wide range involved in the problem (victims or offenders), the physical environment where the problem occurs, of the rules and policies in place to address the problem. Regardless of their approach, students are encouraged to break large problems into smaller pieces to maximize choices for members.

Assessment—Students once again collect information on the problem(s) identified and compare it with the original information collected. If their plans are working, refinements may be introduced. If not, they return to earlier stages for corrective planning.

Throughout the process, external evaluators from PERF and the Mississippi State University are examining both the process by which the school safety program is being implemented and the impact of that program on the school environment and students. The evaluation itself employs a quasi-experimental design with matched schools—one high school receives the program, with the other acting as a control school.

Expected results of the school safety program include reductions in crime, delinquency and vandalism rates; reductions in school disorder disciplinary actions (suspensions and expulsions); and improvement in the overall school climate, with higher morale among staff and students, improved race relations and higher parental and community involvement.

For more information on the Charlotte school safety program, contact Dennis Kenney at PERF.