

Problem Solving Quarterly

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Reporting on innovations in **problem-oriented policing**.

Day Laborers and Community All Benefit from New Employment Facility

by Officer Javier Ruiz, Glendale, Calif., Police Department

Chief James Anthony introduced the Community Police Partnership (COPPS) philosophy to the Glendale Police Department in 1994. The initial community policing unit consisted of one sergeant, two sworn officers, one nonsworn officer and one volunteer. The targeted service area consisted of one square mile.


During the initial phase of COPPS implementation, officers held strategy meetings to discuss ways of expanding community policing citywide. This strategic planning also included dialogue related to the types of problems that Community Lead Officers would address.

:Scanning

Problems addressed through COPPS are long-term and recurring, create blight in the community, and negatively influence the quality of life in a given area. In July 1995, Community Lead Officers Javier Ruiz and Ron Gillman focused their problem-solving efforts on the "unsolvable" problem of day laborers in Glendale.

Day laborers solicit employment on a daily, temporary basis. Most often, they wait for employment on streets and sidewalks in commercial areas or in parking lots adjoining building or paint supply stores. The problems associated with the congregation of day laborers had plagued the city for almost 25 years. It was a genuine community problem involving blight and quality-of-life issues for all concerned—residents, business owners and the laborers themselves.

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Follow-Up Protocol Reduces Repeat Domestic Violence Calls

by Sergeant Mike Eads, Fremont, Calif., Police Department

In 1995, the Fremont Police Department began reviewing the quality of service provided to the community and what changes were needed to improve service. One of the first issues that staff reviewed was the number of repeat calls to the same location, which generate an inordinate workload. Department managers and officers initially named bars, nightclubs and shopping centers as the primary sites of multiple return calls for service. The Information Systems Unit generated reports covering 1993, 1994 and the first three quarters of 1995.

The data generated included all locations where three or more calls for service occurred. Over the time period studied, hundreds of locations were identified.

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Editor's Note:

This issue features the 1997 Herman Goldstein Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing award-winning project—the Glendale, Calif., day laborer project. The Fremont, Calif., domestic violence project won one of four honorable mentions. The other honorable mention projects will be featured in future issues of *Problem Solving Quarterly*.

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COPPS officers recognized that a variety of problems occurred in areas where day laborers assembled. These problems included laborers "swarming" vehicles at intersections, resulting in traffic hazards and congestion; street and sidewalk obstruction; harassment of pedestrians; and fighting among the laborers. Additional problems included theft, property damage, trash, excessive noise, public intoxication, gambling, prostitution, drugs, and public urination and defecation.

Analysis

The COPPS team that originated this program conducted a comprehensive study before formulating a response. Every year, tens of thousands of dollars were spent dealing with issues concerning day laborers. Requests for service involved not only the police, but a variety of other city divisions such as fire and paramedic services, code enforcement and the sanitation department. The resources of several other county, state, and federal social and governmental agencies were also utilized.

Due to these repeated calls for service and the corresponding evidence gathered by the COPPS team, it was not difficult to document the incredible negative impact and blight caused by day laborers in the areas in which they congregated.

Residents and business owners complained about the impediment of traffic as workers swarmed and scrambled into waiting vehicles. Sidewalks were blocked and pedestrians were often harassed. Laborers used nearby buildings and parking lots as public bathrooms, and left trash on the sidewalks, streets and gutters.

Community members directly affected by the congregation of day laborers were extremely vocal in their complaints. Officers met with community members regularly while developing the day labor project.

The laborers' interests, and welfare were also considered in developing a solution to the problem. COPPS officers were

committed to designing a comprehensive response that included day laborer participation and "buy-in" of the project. The day laborers' acceptance of the program was considered necessary to ensure a successful resolution of the problem. Officers met routinely with laborers to learn more about their perspective and stay abreast of their needs and concerns.

The growing casual workforce of day laborers mostly comprises male immigrants. Most are recent immigrants and refugees from Central or South America and Mexico. Additionally, there are migrant farm workers seeking an economic alternative in an urban workforce.

Like all of us, day laborers want to work to provide basic necessities for themselves and their families. However, they often lack English language skills, formal education, and in some cases, legal documentation. Thus, casual labor remains their sole employment option.

In developing a response, the officers considered both community needs and the laborers' interests.

Even when hired, day laborers usually make less than minimum wage and may work only one or two days a week. They often do not receive their promised wages. There have been incidents of felony assaults among the laborers due to the fierce competition for jobs, leading to "survival of the fittest."

Since many workers are recent immigrants and refugees, many are fearful of government officials, especially immigration officers, and are reluctant to sign any document. It was therefore very important to the project's success that COPPS officers form positive relationships with the laborers to gain their trust and cooperation.

Previous attempts to address the situation had only temporary and limited success. Traditionally, police department efforts amounted to extra patrol in affected areas

or the deployment of a special response team that would target a particular area for a certain amount of time.

However, since there were no laws prohibiting the solicitation of employment on city streets and sidewalks, the only recourse that remained was reactive—issuing citations for pedestrian jaywalking, littering or public intoxication, or making an occasional arrest for assault or drug possession. There was no plan to proactively address the root cause of the problem. As a result, when enforcement was redirected, the problems returned.

Attempts to involve the private/social service sector were also complete failures. In one instance, Catholic Charities attempted to use one of their offices as a day labor center. However, the center's distance from any building supply stores, and lack of incentive for laborers to use the facility, doomed the project. The City of Glendale continued its search for a comprehensive approach to the day labor problem.

Response

The main objective of the day labor program was to develop, manage and operate a fixed hiring site where prospective laborers could lawfully assemble to solicit temporary employment without causing problems for the surrounding community. Officers began by meeting with major social service providers such as the Salvation Army and Catholic Charities to discuss the feasibility of such a facility.

In a series of successful meetings, the officers introduced a balanced, humane approach that would manage the congregation of laborers throughout the city. Catholic Charities expressed interest in managing such a program and becoming an active partner in the development of the center. As the largest social service provider in Glendale, Catholic Charities was already heavily involved with Glendale's Community Development Department. In addition, their staff was very familiar with the laborers' cultural and immigration issues.

With one of the key partnerships established to ensure permanent resolution,

COPPS officers and community members developed a program tailored to community needs that would address the issue from a variety of perspectives. As they devised a response plan, COPPS officers decided that several issues had to be addressed. First, the program had to be well-balanced. Community' interests had to be weighed equally with the workers' interests. Laborers needed a safe, organized location to solicit work and benefit from social services as well.

Second,, while the police and other city divisions needed to respond to community complaints, the political and legal issues involved were also major considerations. City officials were well aware of the potentially negative perception of creating a facility that might serve some undocumented workers. There was also the possibility of community activists protesting perceived civil rights violations involved in enacting laws to make curbside. solicitation illegal. Potential litigation because of the use of city property was also a concern.

Third, COPPS officers knew that day laborer programs existed elsewhere with various degrees of success. Officers sought to learn more about other programs' successes and failures. Therefore, they included two visits to existing day labor sites in Southern California in their response plan. These site visits provided much-needed insight into the development and implementation of a project of this type, and made the officers aware of the serious drawbacks that could result from the absence of a comprehensive program.

Finally, officers developed a response that provided services to the laborers and also solved a longstanding community problem. COPPS officers, in partnership with the community, proposed a five-step approach for solving the problems related to day laborers:

1. Locate a facility site. A railroad easement was located across from the city's Home Depot store, which attracted the greatest number of day laborers due to the high demand for unskilled labor from the building supply store's customers. As a

result, this area was also one of the most blighted areas of the community in terms of day laborer congregation. Conveniently, the identified location. was available for lease from the Metropolitan Transit Authority (MTA),,and this became the site for the new facility.

2.'Develop the site. The facility would include a paved drive-up area off of the main road, a staff office,,a waiting area, access for the disabled, telephones, benches, shade awnings, and health and sanitary facilities such as fresh drinking water, rest rooms; handwashing areas and trash receptacles.

The officers knew' that, without an ordinance requiring employers and laborers to use the employment facility, the project would not be successful.

3. Staff the facility. The need for full-time staffing was evident. If the facility was unsupervised, the same problems would exist there that existed on the streets. Workers staffing the site would employ a lottery system to ensure that no laborer would receive preferential treatment. Laborers would be divided into areas of specialty skills—a plus for potential employers. Staff would assist laborers with social services such as food, clothing, shelter, immigration services, English classes, legal services, wage negotiation and a host of other quality-of-life programs. In addition, staff would maintain records on the number of people hired, wages offered and the number of employers using the facility.

4: Create a new ordinance :to require laborers and employers to use the site. Absent the authority of a municipal code section, laborers or employers, would not be motivated to use the facility. A municipal code would make unlawful both the , solicitation and the offering of day labor employment anywhere other than the facility. The No Solicitation Zone in Glendale would cover all public and properly posted private places 24 hours a day.

Employers or workers who refused to use the site would be subject to citation or arrest. Such an ordinance would ensure that workers used the facility, eliminating the "survival of the fittest" culture that had been evident on street corners.

5. Establish an outreach program. An intensive education program would teach employers and laborers about the benefits of using such a facility. Employers would learn that their labor pool would be divided according to specialties (painters, framers, plumbers, etc.). Laborers would be offered a safe, organized environment in which to solicit work and receive a variety of social services. Volunteers would be used for the outreach education plan.

COPPS officers were confident that this plan represented the best possible solution to the day labor issue. Alternate plans that were considered included established a No Solicitation ordinance without a fixed hiring site, or procuring a day labor center without an ordinance. However, the COPPS team felt very strongly that if any one of their five' proposed components was eliminated, the project's success would be threatened.

A fixed, permanent location would give workers an alternative to the practice of "swarming" vehicles. A supervised day labor center would achieve a more systematic, approach to filling the mutual needs of potential employers and the casual workforce in Glendale. Problems arising from the solicitation of employment along city streets would be substantially decreased.

Throughout the development of this proposal, COPPS officers met regularly with a variety of community representatives. These groups and individuals included Home Depot representatives, surrounding businesses, nearby residents, city officials, MTA, social service providers, community activists and the laborers themselves. All sides of the issue were carefully considered.

A Day Labor Advisory Board was created to ensure the continued effectiveness of

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Laborers from page 3

the community-police partnerships being formed. The board included Home Depot's loss prevention manager and a paid consultant who represented Home Depot's corporate offices in Atlanta, Ga. Local business owners and residents were also represented, as was Glendale's city manager's office, Community Development Department and Redevelopment Agency. Catholic Charities and the Salvation Army were also active participants.

Advisory board meetings addressed the development of a long-term, collaborative approach to the day labor issue. Prior to these meetings, the private sector felt that the problem was the city's responsibility, and city officials felt it was a shared responsibility. The results of these meetings were as follows:

- The board decided that the only true solution to the day labor issue was a collaborative one involving business owners, residents, the city, police and the private/social service sector.
- Home Depot committed to providing construction materials for the facility and funding for one staff position for five years, if COPPS carried out the plan to address the day labor issue.
- The city agreed to address the problem if there was significant private-sector involvement, including private-sector provision of a social service worker to administer the program.
- Catholic Charities agreed to administer the program if COPPS could find funding for the site worker position(s).
- COPPS agreed to proceed with the project plan if all entities present committed to honor their offers.

All involved partners agreed that the proposal could successfully address the issue, but there were no public funds available to begin the project. Construction costs were estimated at \$100,000. To obtain -

funding, COPPS wrote proposals for two grants from Glendale's Community Development Block Grant (CDBG) allocation. They received one \$49,377 grant for facility development. They requested a second grant of \$40,452 for staff and recurring costs. Although this second grant received only partial funding, the city manager helped arrange for the additional funding to be provided as a service-level increase within the Community Development Department, with this increase allocated to the day labor project.

Home Depot supplied all of the building materials for the center, as well as an office trailer. Their monetary contributions, including funding for a paid staff worker with benefits, exceeded \$50,000.

In cooperation with Catholic Charities, COPPS initiated the hiring of a day labor site coordinator. This person would be managed by Catholic Charities and work closely with COPPS officers on a daily basis.

The day laborer facility has not only improved quality of life for the neighborhood, but for the laborers as well. Each day, 80 to 100 percent of laborers find work, and many also - take advantage of available social services_

The partnerships formed and developed during this project were very successful and long-lasting. However, the partners had to work together to overcome obstacles along the way. In fact, they encountered difficulties in almost every phase of the project.

For example, before they could proceed with their plan, officers had to get the cooperation of all entities involved. The historically conservative city council was skeptical about the use of taxpayer money to deal with a problem previously considered unsolvable. They also had legal and political concerns, as mentioned above.

In meetings with Home Depot representatives, officers had to propose the program in terms of benefit to the community and increased sales for Home Depot. They demonstrated that investing in this partnership would not only solve the day labor problems in and around the store, but would also improve health and safety for their customers and the surrounding community. This ultimately resulted in Home Depot hiring a paid consultant to function as the liaison between Home Depot and COPPS to facilitate the center's construction.

In addition, there were numerous complications involving the lease agreement with MTA, and the usual construction delays and cost overruns associated with any project of this size.

Any one of these obstacles could have derailed the project; however, COPPS and concerned community members were very resourceful and dedicated to the successful resolution of this issue. After a year and a half of intensive work, a previously unmanageable problem was solved.

Assessment

Laborers are no longer congregating in various areas of the city. As the project intended, their activities are now confined to one managed location.

By design, the close relationship between COPPS officers and laborers has resulted in the laborers' voluntary compliance with the No Solicitation ordinance. Although the ordinance is available as a tool for noncompliant individuals, no enforcement action has been necessary to date.

The project's success is documented by the positive feedback received from the community, as well as statistics gathered by Catholic Charities and the Glendale Police Department's Crime Analysis Unit. All sources indicate that the day labor program has dramatically improved the quality of life for day laborers, the surrounding community and local business, and has reduced the demands placed on emergency services.

Statistics showed that, before the facility opened, only 10 percent of day laborers

received work while standing along curbs. Now that the facility is open, statistics reveal that, on an average day, 80 to 100 percent of the laborers receive work. In addition, laborers have taken advantage of the variety of social services offered at the center, including English language instruction, computer classes and classes related to immigration.

Local residents and business owners are no longer subjected to the problems associated with the congregation of day laborers. In addition, there has been a significant reduction in the number of incidents requiring attention from various city divisions such as police, fire, etc. This has resulted in a dramatic savings to the community.

The program could have been more effective with a broader marketing strategy in place before the center's opening. The majority of education efforts were directed, toward laborers, with less emphasis on contractors, other employers and the community at large. This resulted in some confusion regarding the center's usage and application of the ordinance.

COPPS officers were not concerned about displacing the problem elsewhere. On the contrary, they anticipated that a successful resolution of the problem might increase the number of laborers coming to Glendale, since they would be more apt to find work. Therefore, COPPS officers met with representatives from other communities to assist them in developing their own day labor centers.

To ensure the continued success of this project and the adherence to the rules and procedures established for the center's operation, the advisory board monitors day-to-day operation and facilitates education and outreach program efforts. COPPS officers continue to nurture the partnerships created with the various community entities, to ensure that their commitment to the center continues.

Domestic Violence from page 1

Most surprising was the number of locations involving repeat calls for service for domestic violence, and the number of calls to these locations.

The information indicated that domestic violence calls were the most frequent type of repeat call for service. The data also indicated a distinct pattern, showing an escalation from argument to restraining orders, battery and assaults with weapons. Some calls escalated to attempted murder and murder. As the calls at a particular location increased, so did the amount of staff time necessary to deal with the call and the number of reports resulting from more serious criminal cases.

A British police agency's successful follow-up protocol for burglary locations inspired Fremont officers to develop a similar response to repeat calls for domestic violence.

Domestic violence occurred throughout the community and was not confined to any specific geographic area or any group of people. The calls for service data, as well as information from the Shelter Against Violent Environments (SAVE)—a local domestic violence support organization—clearly showed a community problem that has existed for many years.

Approximately 98 percent of the victims are women. SAVE indicates that suspects are generally the women's husbands, and drugs or alcohol play a role in most cases. The crime involves the batterers' need for control and power, and in most cases, the victims are fearful of homelessness, financial difficulties and further alcohol abuse if they try to leave the abusive environment.

Before the police department instituted the new approach to repeat domestic violence calls, police officers responded to the calls and, unless a battery, assault or other violent act occurred, they would mediate the matter and then leave without

really solving the problem. Domestic violence locations were generally not identified until some act of violence occurred or the victim demanded an arrest. In many cases, the victim wanted no police involvement beyond the initial mediation efforts: Because calls were not always formally documented, a high number of these crimes were not included in the available data.

Fremont officers recognized the nature of domestic violence, and SAVE training had helped them understand the dynamics of this crime. Because of some high-profile cases associated with the police response to domestic violence cases, officers perceived an increased danger of injury or death when answering these calls. Some officers said they didn't like answering these calls and wanted to see their numbers reduced: They didn't feel confident in what they accomplished when responding to these calls. For the officers, the question was how to reduce domestic violence calls and continue to protect the victims. Officers wanted to help victims avoid violence and further victimization.

The department authorized arrest in domestic violence cases when that action was warranted. When no arrest was made, officers would mediate domestic violence calls. They took no follow-up action after the initial call was completed. While they might help resolve the immediate problem, they could not provide the long-term resolution necessary to reduce or eliminate the crime. The follow-up practice of the West Huddersfield Police in England was so successful in reducing repeat property crimes, that Fremont police began considering this approach for domestic violence cases. West Huddersfield developed a follow-up protocol for burglary victims. In the first burglary follow-up, officers gave crime prevention tips and help in reinforcing the home with better security and property identification. Following a second burglary at the same location, officers took additional measures, including alarming the home and disseminating neighborhood alerts. A third burglary resulted in video surveillance of

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Domestic Violence from page 5

the home and a direct alarm to the local police station.

The information about West Huddersfield encouraged Fremont officers to try a follow-up approach for repeat victims of domestic violence. By recontacting both victim and suspect after the violence, officers could provide counseling information in a calmer setting, and reinforce the idea that domestic violence is a crime that can result in criminal prosecution. Also, the police presence could emphasize to victims that they do not need to remain in violent situations if they choose not to.

The department developed and initiated a specific protocol in January 1996, with a pilot team of officers who made up approximately one-sixth of the patrol force. The officers were required to document all domestic violence calls in a police report and then complete an in-person follow-up within seven days of the first call. A second follow-up was required within 28 days of the first call. In each follow-up visit, officers were asked to determine if additional violence had occurred since the last contact, offer information about counseling services available to both victims and suspects, reinforce the support for victims, and reinforce that the victim does not need to be further victimized in the future. The primary concern was to follow up with the victim; however, follow-up with the suspect was encouraged. When possible, officers were to reinforce with the suspect the potential for arrest and prosecution if further violence occurred. Each follow-up was documented in a supplemental report to the original case, so a report package was created.

One of the key elements of the follow-up protocol was officers' being open and honest with the victims and suspects. Officers were directed to inform both parties of the follow-up protocol and that there would be continued efforts to call on them in the future. Officers *did* not make appointments; the parties were told that follow-up would occur any time during the officer's regular shift. Officers were responsible for tracking their own cases and informing fellow team members

of their cases, so that two officers did not have two separate cases in progress at the same location. Once an officer followed the protocol at a location, he or she was responsible for that location until the protocol was completed. With a small group of officers, tracking and following cases was not difficult.

During the program's first year, officers were interviewed weekly about the responses they received during follow-up calls. The officers reported positive feedback, especially from the victims. Most victims, and some suspects, reported seeking other avenues of conflict resolution. No officers reported negative contact during the follow-up protocol, while some did report that the parties requested no further follow-up action, asking the police not to return to their homes. This request was honored when both the victim and suspect made the request, but the officers did not offer this option. The department received no citizen complaints regarding an officer completing the follow-up protocol during the 1996 pilot program year. Data for 1996, when compared with data for 1995, indicated a 21.88 percent reduction in repeat calls for service to locations of domestic violence. In 1995, officers went to 221 locations three or more times, for a total of 871 domestic violence calls. The locations with fewer than three calls for service were not tracked. In 1996, during the pilot program, officers went to 150 locations three or more times, for a total of 681 domestic violence calls.

The program goals were multifaceted. First and primary was to reduce the number of repeat calls involving domestic violence and reduce repeat victimizations. Second was to allow officers more time for other patrol responsibilities. The final goal was to assess community response to the concept of officers making follow-up visits without first receiving a call for service. The department hoped to build support for additional follow-up programs for other types of repeat calls.

To measure the program's success, officers would track locations where three or more repeat calls occurred during the time frame reviewed. Officers would compare the number of staff hours spent on repeat

calls, using an average time of one-and-a-half hours per call. To measure victims', offenders' and the public's acceptance of the program, officers would interview victims and offenders, and analyze the number of citizen complaints received as a result of the follow-up protocol.

Officers participating in the pilot program were especially concerned that they would be accused of harassment and violating the victims' and suspects' privacy rights. Some officers worried that the extra police presence in a neighborhood and at a particular home might attach a negative stigma to the victim family. They also feared creating a more hostile and violent situation by bringing up previous violence on their follow-up visits.

However, none of these problems occurred. Results of the year-long pilot program showed that victims, and in some cases suspects, accepted the follow-up protocol. When the program was expanded departmentwide, the remaining patrol force voiced the same concerns. But again, not a single complaint was received about the officers completing domestic violence follow-up. In 1997, no victim or suspect filed a complaint concerning an officer making follow-up visits. Officers who were interviewed reported positive contacts with victims and suspects. Many reported no additional violence, and some victims chose counseling or separation as a means of resolving the conflict.

SAVE proved to be a valuable resource. Officers could refer people directly to their services. SAVE also had a legal support mechanism to assist with temporary restraining orders and other legal aid. During the 1996 pilot program period, police department administrative staff worked on a federal grant application to fund staff positions, in the four southern Alameda County police departments to further follow up on cases and enhance early intervention. SAVE obtained a \$250,006 grant to hire advocates, develop community education programs and build an advocacy program in the departments. Under the grant, domestic violence advocates were assigned to the police department, and given an office and interview

space, with copies of all domestic violence and family dispute cases sent to them: Advocates follow up by telephone with victims, suspects or both, and offer services to prevent future violence in the home. Counseling, safety planning and community resources for other family programs are also offered.

The grant program fits well with the officers' follow-up protocol, since the victim advocates can offer assistance upon receiving an officer's report, rather than waiting for the victims to contact SAVE. The grant advocates also work closely with officers and provide additional training to officers in techniques to better meet the needs of victims and suspects.

Due to the pilot program's success in 1996, the department decided to expand the program in 1997 to all patrol and investigative services. Officers were trained at patrol briefings and received training bulletins on the procedures to be followed. Because the expanded program includes all shifts and officers, a more formal tracking system was developed. When an officer is called to a location, the Communications Unit searches the existing database for prior calls to the location, and then identifies the types of calls previously dispatched. The officers are made aware of this history, and then know which officer, if any, is already conducting a follow-up on a previous call. When it is determined that an active case is ongoing at a location, officers write a supplemental report to the existing case and forward a copy to the responsible officer. This report then becomes the indicator of a need to increase police presence at the location to reduce the number of future calls for service.

When chronic locations are identified, officers conduct an even more intensive follow-up regime involving multiple follow-up visits and pursuit of other legal options, such as victimless prosecution and provision of restraining orders for both parties, even when neither party requests one.

Data for the first quarter of the program in 1997 were compared with data from the same quarter for 1995 and 1996. The

results were, a 57 percent reduction in repeat calls for service compared with 1996, and a 66 percent reduction in repeat calls for service compared with 1995. This saved the department an estimated 109 hours of staff time compared with the first quarter of 1995, and 75 staff hours compared with the first quarter of 1996. The positive reception officers have received from the public is an additional benefit. The SAVE advocates report that many of the people contacted are requesting more information and taking the steps necessary to resolve problems within the home before, additional violence occurs. Officers recognize that the decreases in repeat calls could be because the suspects and victims are no longer calling the police or are moving out of the community. While this might be the case in some circumstances, it seems impossible for it to occur with enough regularity to result in a 57 percent decrease in repeat calls for service. Additional analysis compared data from the first three quarters of 1997 with data from the same time period in 1996. There were 199 calls for service in 1997, compared with 438 in 1996—a 53 percent reduction.

It is expected that, eventually, repeat domestic violence calls will be limited to truly chronic problem locations. In the next phase of the program, the department will assign a team of officers to conduct intensive follow-up at chronic problem locations to prevent additional calls. This intervention might include court-ordered counseling, billing for exceptional service time, and mandatory drug and alcohol treatment in cases where substance abuse is a factor.

As an additional evaluative measure, SAVE is tracking police officer referrals to determine if more victims are contacting SAVE as a result of the follow-up protocol. SAVE will also expand its education and referral services, and provide more intensive early intervention to victims and offenders at chronic problem locations.

The goal of all of these efforts is to avoid escalation of domestic violence into serious crimes and thus improve the quality of life enjoyed by Fremont citizens.

Problem Solving Quarterly Submission Guidelines

PERF invites submissions of articles describing successful problem-solving projects. Articles should discuss the four phases of the effort:

1. **Scanning:** What was the problem? How and by whom was it identified?
2. **Analysis:** What methods, data and information sources were used to analyze the problem? What did the analysis reveal about the nature and extent of the problem? How was the community involved in analyzing the problem?
3. **Response:** What responses were considered? What responses were implemented, and how were they developed as a result of analysis? What was the goal of the response plan?
4. **Assessment:** What were the results? How were results evaluated, and for how long? Was the response goal accomplished? Are there any efforts underway to maintain or monitor the long-term results of the project?

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Dangerous Drag Racing ceases on a City street

by captain Ross E. Swope,
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In the warehouse district of Washington, D.C., lies a broad, straight, flat street nearly a mile long—V Street. After business hours and on weekends, the street is mostly deserted. After 5 p.m. on many weekends, V Street became the site of illegal drag racing. Images of drag racing and fast cars as portrayed in Beach Boys' songs or movies such as *American Graffiti* may stir nostalgic memories of simpler times. But in reality, the drag racing on V Street was a dangerous activity that put an undue burden on area police.

Scanning

Illegal drag racing had been occurring on V Street for at least a decade. This racing attracted up to 50 racers and as many as 200 spectators nearly every weekend. Warehouse owners complained about the traffic, graffiti, vandalism and trash generated by spectators. The racing also made considerable demands on the police. More than 50 percent of the calls for service on V Street were generated on the weekends, when there should have been little or no need for police service, since the warehouses are closed. As disturbing as these conditions were, there was a more serious and, in fact, catastrophic consequence of the racing. On May 24, 1997, a spectator was killed and another person seriously injured when a racing car lost control. The striking car subsequently left the scene—a hit-and-run fatality.

Analysis

Police collected information about the problem by observing the weekend activity and interviewing spectators. Initially, drag racers had used actual race cars, but over the years, the race cars had become, too fast for the street, and racers did not have enough room to stop. More recently, races were held between vehicles not specifically equipped for racing. People would still bring race cars to the site, but

these were more for show than for use. The races were approximately one-quarter of a mile long, and involved speeds of 80 to 90 miles per hour. On occasion, vehicles might travel as fast as 130 miles per hour.

One of the officers assigned to the beat discovered a Web site advertising the area to racers across the country. By researching this Web site and observing the tags of visiting cars, officers discovered that racers were usually from D.C., Maryland or Virginia, but spectators came from as far as New Jersey and Pennsylvania.

The problems caused by the racing were many. Noise caused burglary alarms to go off. Trash piled up where spectators disposed of refuse while watching the races. Numerous accidents occurred, including the fatal accident in May 1997. And, of course, the police were responding to an inordinate number of calls to what should have been a quiet, deserted neighborhood over the weekends.

The police employed a number of tactics over the years to address the problem. Traffic enforcement, such as ticketing and radar, were ineffective because the racers had lookouts and ceased racing when scout cars drove onto the block. The street ends at a major highway that connects to the interstate, and the D.C./Maryland state line is less than a mile away. The department's pursuit policy prohibited officers from chasing cars for traffic violations, and in any case, violators could be in Maryland and outside the department's jurisdiction in less than 60 seconds: Police periodically blocked the street or opened the fire hydrants to flood the street, but these tactics provided only short-term deterrents. Police could not maintain a constant presence, and the hydrants could only be opened periodically so that there would still be sufficient water pressure to fight warehouse fires.

In the final analysis, officers' interviews of participants confirmed that the one element that most encouraged racing on V Street was the layout and location of the street itself. The street is long, straight and flat—tailor-made for drag racing. The street was deserted on weekends, with vir-

tually no traffic and few cars parked on the street. The proximity to a highway and state line provided an easy escape route if police showed up, and made the area easy to find for those traveling to the city to attend the races. Police thus determined that the solution was to make the street a less attractive location for drag racing.

Response

Several suggestions were made to curb the problem. Officers discussed installing stop signs and/or speed bumps, but these solutions were rejected. Racers who did not obey the posted 25 mile per hour speed limit would likely not obey stop signs: Warehouse tenants resisted the use of speed bumps, since they would cause problems for trucks traveling the road during business hours.

Eventually, Fifth District officers decided to try changing the street's traffic pattern. The department contacted the city's public works department, and on July 27, 1997, they placed six flexible jersey-type barricades along V Street. The barricades were spaced approximately 200 yards from each other; and each blocked three-quarters of a lane of traffic. They were placed on alternating sides of the street, creating a long S-shaped traffic pattern. The street was repainted with lines to indicate the new traffic lane patterns. V Street was thus transformed from a broad, straight thoroughfare to a slow, winding road. Normal traffic would still be able to travel on the street fairly easily, but the street became unsuitable for drag racing.

Assessment

The racing has been completely eliminated. Complaints from business owners about trash and vandalism have stopped. Calls for service on the weekend have fallen to a level that is normal for a closed warehouse area. Empty bottles and fast-food wrappers are no longer littering the area. The only negative result was that the barricades eliminated some parking places used during business hours. However, there is still plenty of parking; and this just requires some people to have a slightly longer walk from their cars to the warehouses.

1998 Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing: Call for Submissions

The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is soliciting nominations for its sixth annual Herman Goldstein Award for Excellence in Problem-Oriented Policing. The award recognizes innovative and effective problem-oriented policing (POP) projects that have achieved measurable success in reducing specific crime, disorder or public safety problems. The award will be presented at the Ninth Annual International Problem-Oriented Policing Conference in San Diego, Calif., Oct. 31-Nov. 3, 1998. Several agencies submitting leading projects will have the opportunity to present their work at the conference.

This competition recognizes exemplary problem-oriented policing projects. Though many previous winning projects have focused on a very specific problem in a specific neighborhood, you are encouraged to consider problems that are much larger and affect many people. Keep in mind that problems are not only geographically focused. For example, a problem may affect certain types of people or occur at a certain time. Be creative, since we are seeking projects that successfully resolved any type of recurring problem faced by police. Examples include drug-dealing in a strip mall, loitering day laborers, trespassers at a high school, '911 hang-ups,' prostitution on a major thoroughfare, drug-dealing and gang activity in a neighborhood, drunk driving throughout a large metropolitan region, and disorder and criminal activity in an apartment complex.

The award also honors Professor Herman Goldstein, who conceived and developed the theory of problem-oriented policing. As professor emeritus at the University of Wisconsin Law-School, Professor Goldstein continues to advance POP and inspire police officers around the world.

Eligibility

All employees of governmental policing agencies worldwide who directly deliver police services to the public are eligible for the award. Agencies may submit as many nominations as they wish. Submissions must address all four phases of the SARA problem-solving model. Previously submitted entries are not eligible.

Judges

Selection will be made by a committee of top international POP practitioners and researchers. The committee chair is Dean Ron Clarke, School of Criminal Justice, Rutgers University (Newark, N.J.). Other judges are Professor Gary Cordner, Eastern Kentucky University (Richmond, Ky.); Deputy Chief Ron Glensor, Reno Police Department (Reno, Nev.); Nancy LaVigne, National Institute of Justice, U.S. Department of Justice (Washington, D.C.); Director Rana Sampson, Department of Public Safety, University of San Diego (San Diego, Calif.); Greg Saville, Action Assessment Group (Port Moody, British Columbia, Canada); and Mike Scott, police management consultant (Savannah, Ga.).

Requirements for Submission

1. **Abstract:** In at least 300 and not more than 400 words, explain the project; be sure to cover all four stages of the SARA model of problem solving. (Entries received without an abstract will not be considered.)

2., **Description:** In no more than 4,000 words (approximately 15 pages double-spaced), not including charts, tables and graphs, provide a detailed description of the project using the following four-step, SARA problem-solving model outline. Although you should cover as many of the constituent questions as are applicable, they are intended to guide you, not to serve as a blueprint for your project description. In any case, tell the story of your POP project. Be aware that the committee is particularly interested in well-presented data, especially at the assessment stage.

A. Scanning:

1. What was the nature of the problem?
2. How was the problem identified?

Who identified the problem (e.g., community, police managers, officers, politicians, press, etc.)?

4. Far more problems are identified than can be explored adequately. How and why was this problem selected from among problems?

What was the initial level of diagnosis/unit of analysis (e.g., crime type, neighborhood, specific premise, specific offender group, etc.)?

B. Analysis:

1. What methods, data and information sources were used to analyze the problem (e.g. surveys, interviews, observation, crime analysis, etc.)?

History: How often and for how long was it a problem?

3. Who was involved in the problem (offenders, victims, others) and what were their respective motivations, gains and losses?

What harms resulted from the problem?

5. How was the problem being addressed before the problem-solving project? What were the results of those responses?
6. What did the analysis reveal about the causes and underlying conditions that precipitated the problem?
7. What did the analysis reveal about the nature and extent of the problem?
8. What situational information was needed to better understand the problem (e.g., time of occurrence, location, other particulars re: the environment, etc.)?

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9. Was there an open discussion with the community about the problem?

C. Response:

1. What range of possible response alternatives were considered to deal with the problem?
2. What responses did you use to address the problem?
3. How did you develop a response as a result of your analysis?
4. What evaluation criteria were most important to the department before implementation of the response alternative(s) (e.g., legality, community values, potential effectiveness, cost, practicality, etc.)?
5. What did you intend to accomplish with your response plan (i.e., what was the project goal and corresponding measurable objectives)?
6. What resources were available to help solve the problem?
7. What was done before you implemented your response plan?
8. What difficulties were encountered during response implementation?
9. Who was involved in the response to your problem?

D. Assessment:

1. What were the results? What degree of impact did the response plan have on this problem?
2. What were your methods of evaluation and for how long was the effectiveness of the problem-solving effort evaluated?
3. Who was involved in the evaluation?
4. Were there problems in implementing the response plan?
5. If there was no improvement in the

problem, were other systemic efforts considered to handle the problem?

6. What response goals were accomplished?
7. How did you measure your results?
8. What data supported your conclusions?
9. How could you have made the response more effective?
10. Was there a concern about displacement, (i.e., pushing the problem somewhere else)?
11. Will your response require continued monitoring or a continuing effort to maintain your results?

E. Agency and Officer Information

1. At what level of the police organization was this problem-solving initiative adopted (e.g., the entire department, a few select officers, etc.)?
2. Did officers or management receive any training in problem-oriented policing and/or problem solving before this project began or during its execution?
3. Were additional incentives given to police officers who engaged in problem solving?
4. What resources and guidelines (manuals, past problem-solving examples, etc.) were used, if any, by police officers to help them manage this problem-solving initiative?
5. What issues/problems were identified with the problem-oriented

policing model or the problem-solving model?

What general- resources (financial and/or personnel) were committed to this project, and of those resources, what went beyond the existing department budget?

7. Who is the main contact person regarding this award submission? Please include name, address, phone, fax and e-mail-address.

Other Submission instructions

You may include up to ten (10) pages of supporting documents, such as newspaper clippings or magazine articles, in addition to the text, charts, tables and graphs. Unfortunately, videotapes cannot be considered.

Prepare a letter from the agency chief executive nominating the project for the award. Please address the letter to the Herman Goldstein Award Selection Committee. Submit eight (8) copies of the completed application package (nomination letter, abstract and description, and supporting documents). Submissions must be postmarked by **June 12, 1998**.

PERF will publish a compilation of the leading projects. By submitting a project, you agree to allow PERF to include your work in the book-so that your success is accessible to the entire field.

Send packages to the Police Executive Research Forum (PERF), 1120 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 930, Washington, DC 20036, U.S.A., Attention: Herman Goldstein Award. Direct inquiries to Jim Burack of the PERF staff at (202) 466-7820 x276 or <jburack@policeforum.org>.

<p>The Police Executive Research Forum (PERF) is a national association of police executives from large and mid-sized jurisdictions.</p> <p>Board of Directors</p> <p>President: Gil Kerlikowske Vice President: Dennis Nozick Secretary: Jerry Sanders</p>	<p>At-Large: William Finney At-Large: Thomas Kazier At-Large: Ellen Hanson At-Large: John Farrell Ex-Officio: Barbara O'Brien Executive Director: Chuck Wexler Problem Solving Quarterly Editor: Ellen Dollar</p>
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